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Security and Everyday Life

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Introduction
Security Meta-Framing: A Cultural Logic of an Ordering Practice

Vida Bajc

INTRODUCTION

This volume is a contribution to our understanding of the dynamics associated with seeing in all sorts of everyday social situations and cultural phenomena a potential threat to security. The range of such phenomena and activities is wide and diverse. Drug use and street crime, expressions of religious, cultural, or political identity, migration across state territories or state borders, collective public gatherings from sports games to state-sponsored public events—even being in public buildings such as courthouses, schools, hospitals, airports, or city halls—have all become intimately intertwined with the fear that they may be associated with intentions to undermine what is seen as security in everyday living. Popular expressions such as “we need more security here,” “security will be very tight during the event,” “there is a lot of security around that area,” or “there is a lot more security here now than there used to be in the past” attest to this development. Such expressions connote public interpretations of the dynamics associated with what I call security meta-framing (Bajc 2010), an ordering principle of social life that holds security as its central value. Public understanding of security meta-framing captures a number of elements associated with these dynamics, among them an apparatus of institutions and their operatives, surveillance practices and technologies, and a particular kind of social order and perception of safety.

Bureaucratic institutions and their various satellites, including private enterprise, comprise an apparatus of organizations and professionals that claim expertise in the matters of public orderliness. The apparatus arbitrates on what is acceptable public conduct and what types of individual or group behavior count as abnormal and thereby potentially threatening to security. Their operatives are credentialed professionals who see themselves as expertly trained in ways that the general public is not. Historian Andrew Bacevich (2007: xii) writes about the U.S. state apparatus, for example, that “viewing the average citizen as uninformed, fickle, and provincial, members of this elite imagine themselves to be sophisticated, sagacious, and coolly analytical.” Their authority rests on their assertion that they serve in the name of the state as well
surveillance are an outgrowth of a particular kind of a system of classification through which the world is divided into exclusionary categories. As anthropologist Don Handelman (2004: 19–38) describes, rather than organizing the world according to how things are connected and how they work together, this type of classification seeks to identify in every occurrence specific characteristics, and then divide the world according to these attributes into exclusive categories so that each phenomenon and activity can be positioned into a single category. It is this kind of thinking, based on bureaucratic surveillance, exclusionary classification, and probability statistics, that enables the security apparatus to raid a home of an undocumented migrant worker or deny a person the right to board an airplane. This thinking is related to the same rationality that underlies the mechanisms of governance mentioned earlier.

The activity of the security apparatus and its means of bureaucratic surveillance also reflect deeply seated, common-sense cultural assumptions about social order and disorder. They help generate a specific perception of social reality and a particular understanding of how the world works. They connote a domain of experience in which the public has the feeling of being protected from or—alternatively—of being exposed to, potentially harmful irregularities in public life. Therefore, it also reflects a certain set of understandings of what is an acceptable orderliness in interpersonal public conduct and, at the same time, communicates fear of forces of disruption. Although there are multiple understandings of just what this reality of security might or should entail, there is in this multiplicity, as Beck (1992) has suggested, nevertheless a common expectation on the part of the public that something must be done to control forces of chaos. This public expectation, as much as the activities of the security apparatus practiced to respond to these expectations, entail a belief in the potentials of technology to control uncertainty and prevent disruption. There seems to be an assumption that the security apparatus and its surveillance technologies and practices can, in fact, shield the public from the forces of potential disorder and that everything possible will be done to achieve this goal. This belief also entails a fear of the possibility of a certain kind of technology to be in the hands of an enemy who can create mass destruction of life and property.

The security apparatus, its means of surveillance, and particular cultural understandings of order and disorder in public life provide a cultural and institutional environment within which notions of threats to security can be normalized and particular responses to threats expected. They provide conditions of possibility within which the classification of a security problem is able to emerge as a powerful organizing principle, articulating a particular way of ordering everyday life. An ordering principle of social life is an organizational logic of sociality that has the capacity to subsume other rationales for ordering human relations and has the potential to subordinate other social activities to its own order. In this way, such a principle defines the parameters and the conditions of how life should be lived and
articulates a particular way of organizing sociality. I call this ordering principle \textit{security meta-frame}. Its logic is cultural in that it makes sense within a particular kind of cosmological understanding of the world, which, in this case, has decidedly Western European origins. The tendency to see a threat to security in ever larger domains of private and public life suggests that security meta-framing has two general qualities. It is expansive in that its potential is to spread. It is also totalizing in that it is able to subsume within its domain other ordering principles of social life. As Waeber (1995) emphasizes, a classification of a particular issue as a threat to security implies a sense of urgency that can be seen as a crisis of survival of the social unit as a whole to the point that all other social issues and concerns may become irrelevant unless this particular threat is stopped. The activity of classifying social situations and cultural phenomena as a threat to security therefore has a tendency to subsume within its taxonomy other principles of social organization. In a given historical and socio-cultural context, security meta-frame has the potential to be elevated to the top of the collective priorities and, in this way, become the dominant ordering principle in a collectivity.

My conception of security meta-framing, an analytical tool with which I try to capture the dynamics associated with the growing dominance of security as an organizing principle of everyday life, is derived from the communication theory of Gregory Bateson. In his most well-known works, \textit{Steps to an Ecology of Mind} and \textit{Mind and Nature}, Bateson argues that human communication has the capacity to convey messages with multiple meanings simultaneously and at multiple levels of abstraction. Therefore, Bateson reasons, this would create confusion unless some of that communication also contained information about how to interpret the rest of what is conveyed. For this to be intelligible, the interlocutors need a way of discerning which part of the communication conveyed is the basic message and which part carries instructions on how to interpret the basic message. Bateson expresses this idea of communication about communication with a prefix "meta" and articulates this relationship through a theory of framing. He proposes to think of a meta-communicative message as a frame in such a way that whichever information defines the given frame also provides the receiver with instructions about how to understand the messages which relate to that frame. To articulate this relationship between a frame as a meta-message and some basic communication to which it is directed, Bateson draws on the theory of logical types by Whitehead and Russell (1910), conceived—among other matters—to find a mathematical solution that would eliminate the emergence and formation of a logical paradox. A logical paradox is created by a situation in which a particular statement is simultaneously self-negating; for example, simultaneously true and false. In a logical system, such as mathematics that is held together through self-consistency based on set theory, such a paradox is impermissible because it undermines the system's premises. The proposed solution is to arrange statements into a hierarchy of sets such that a set of phenomena is positioned at a lower level and a set about this set of phenomena is positioned at a higher level. In this way, self-consistency is achieved when one refers to phenomena only when they are at the same level; that is, of the same type.

Bateson often refers to types as \textit{classes}. For Bateson (2000a), this hierarchy makes possible for communication at the level of class to be clearly differentiated from its contents. Following the theory of logical types, a class of phenomena must be specifically distinguished from its contents—that is, its members—because the confuting of class and member is a prime cause of the formation of logical paradox. This implies that confusion in communication is avoided when the interlocutors understand a class; that is, a frame as a meta-message which instructs how to interpret the member of that class, that is, the message to which the frame is directed. In this formulation, sets of phenomena are classified into exclusionary categories and arranged hierarchically, such as the Russian matryoshka doll, so that the message of the frame is always of a higher order and value and is, therefore, always meta-communicative to all other basic messages it subsumes. When this hierarchy is not recognized, individuals receiving the messages are faced with a paradoxical situation in which they must choose between clearly delineated sets of messages that do not overlap, are at the same level of abstraction, and are contradictory to each other.

Bateson (2000b) names such inability to discriminate between basic messages and meta-messages a double bind. A double bind is a paradoxical situation in which individuals are in a position where they are aware that it is vital that they make the right choice, and yet whichever option they choose will negatively affect all others. This paradoxical position resembles a situation where messages are at the same level, meaning that they are imbued with the same values or ethos—yet they are contradictory to one another. One way out of the double bind opens up when new information is introduced in such a way that it is recognized by the receiver as meta-communicative to all other messages already received; that is, as a new understanding that can re-establish, yet can also change, a hierarchy of messages.

Bateson (1958), of course, understands very well that mathematical logic of clearly delineated hierarchies of classes is a poor approximation of the complexities of human communication. Indeed, exclusionary framing based on logical typing is only one of the possible kinds of framing. Handelman (2006a), for example, formulates an alternative kind of framing based on the idea of the Möbius surface, a ring which turns inward and outward at the same time so that the inside and the outside are inherently intertwined and the boundary between them is blurred and cannot be clearly delineated. Handelman (2004, 2006b), however, knows full well that there are specific contexts in which the dynamics of communicative interaction do resonate closely with exclusionary framing, particularly in situations involving the bureaucratic system of the modern state and its form of exclusionary classification, an example of which are the dynamics associated with securitization as discussed in this volume. When the classification of security is included among the messages communicated, the
public is typically presented with a situation in which the choice of security is valued more highly than the choice of other values that organize social life in a modern state—such as democracy, the right to privacy, the right to legal council, or human rights—in such a way that security appears as an obvious choice in relation to which the loss of some aspects of other values is seen as a reasonable and worthwhile sacrifice for what the value of security promises to deliver. When the value of security is elevated above other principles of social organization in a modern state, it becomes a meta-frame in relation to which other social activity becomes referenced and in accordance to which all other social life becomes organized.

What I call security meta-framing is more than what the common-sense understanding of the term “frame” or “framing” may suggest. The words “frame” and “framing” have a wide popular appeal and are used frequently in common parlance as in the sense of “giving a story a particular spin” or “making you see something in a particular way.” In this sense, Simmel (1994: 17) writes that a picture frame, a molding which surrounds a painting, serves to “solve the problem in the visual sphere of mediating between the work of art and its milieu, separating and connecting.” Similarly, framing is frequently used in various fields of social research as an analytical concept; however, its usage tends to be mechanical and typological, missing the very important epistemological aspect of this form of interpersonal communication and activity. Goffman (1986: 8–11) popularized the concept of framing in terms of a “frame of reference,” as “a framework that could be appealed to for the answer” to the question “What is it that’s going on here?” as a “strip . . . cut from the stream of ongoing activity . . . a raw batch of occurrences that one wants to draw attention to as a starting point for analysis,” and a “slogan to refer to the examination in these terms of the organization of experience.”

For Bateson, framing is an integral component of human communication because interpersonal communication involves exchanging messages at multiple levels of abstraction, where some messages carry instructions on how to interpret other messages being communicated. Framing organizes, interprets, and directs the basic part of the communication exchange. The security meta-frame, in the sense of ‘framing’ used by Bateson, is profoundly consequential in its social effects. When security is elevated to the level of the dominant ordering principle of social life, the security meta-frame becomes a condition of possibility within which are articulated not only thought but also practice. This condition of possibility is grounded in what I call elsewhere a *governmentality of potentialities* (Bajc 2007a), a rationale of governing that uses information gathering through surveillance technologies and techniques, statistical probabilities, computer modeling, profiling, and secrecy as means to envision or discover threats to security and then pre-empt such envisioned threats from materializing; that is, to deliver security by seeking to control the future. Security meta-framing is an outcome of this ordering practice.
out of the state. To this end, they develop apparatuses that monopolize the authority over movements of people, invent procedures to identify each and every member of its collectivity, require from each individual in its territory proper documentation, and implement codified laws that determine who may or may not cross the border or the state territory and under what conditions (Torpey 1998).

Second, as the territorial boundaries impose control over movements of people, they encircle certain groups of people within a spatial enclosure. In the pre-state Europe, the people who found themselves within this enclosure felt they were part of various nomadic groups, families, kinship groups, migrant groups, itinerant traveling groups, and various urban and rural settlements. They had loyalties to various indigenous hierarchies, and their ways of life followed the patterns of their own various internal structures of relations. This raises the question of how to reorder the lives of the people within the territorial boundaries for the needs of the state; that is, how the productivity of every citizen can effectively contribute to the prosperity of the state. An efficient management of this process would minimize disorder and irregularities in the workings of the people and the economy in favor of rational and controlled planning of social life. Apparatuses and mechanisms are set up to first separate each individual from his or her kinship group and then turn such an individual into what Foucault calls a "governing subject." The totality of such individuals can now comprise what becomes thought of as a population, a collectivity whose different aspects of life can be subjected to governing, management, and planning by the apparatuses. It is this population that is eventually able to see itself as a nation, a people who belong to a particular state. Governing in an organized and standardized fashion is achieved through what Sassen (2008: 6) calls a "centripetal scaling" under the umbrella of the state. This centripetal scaling is a hierarchy in which the state seeks to subsume under its domain human activity within its territory through the institutionalization of sovereign authority by means of a system of formally codified rules and regulations in which formally written law of what is and is not allowed overrides the various versions of indigenous agreements and localized legal practices. Foucault (2008: 44) refers to this authority as "centripetal discipline," a mechanism which "isolates a space that it determines a segment," and within this isolated space "concentrates, focuses, and encloses."

Foucault (2008) suggests that this transformation of peoples into a governable population found affinity with already-existing dynamics that developed through Christianization of Europe. What he labels "the pastoral" encompasses a particular way of life of a group of people under the protective shield of its leadership. The pastor is responsible for the well-being of all the individual believers from the time they are born to the moment of their death, following them wherever they go so that they may be able to find the path to ultimate fulfillment. The believers, in turn, as individuals and as a group, learn to follow the pastor’s leadership and put their souls in the hands of a good shepherd so that they may be able to reach the eternal life. Foucault suggests that this is a type of authority that administers the entire existence not only of a group as a whole but of each and every person as an individual and also as a member of a collectivity. To the leader, the pastoral power is a responsibility of having to protect the souls of each individual from harm and to shield one and all from misfortune. The pastoral form of authority over the souls of men, Foucault suggests, is the background for the development of governing of the population as a calculated practice of apparatuses and mechanisms so that the authority over the spiritual is transitioned into a newly forming authority over the political. In these terms, such a population comes to expect that action will be taken in the face of a threat to security by the security apparatus.

Third, the exclusive authority and rights over a territory and its population bring to existence a reciprocal principle in relation to territorial sovereignty of other states, effectively establishing a system of states, each situated along the other and each in competition with the other so that the security of a given state is also dependent on its relation to other states. Through this principle of the interstate system, each state is compelled to protect its own sovereign rights against the aspirations, interests, and needs of other states (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998). Following Foucault (2007), preservation and maintenance of the state within this system require a method of governing that can simultaneously foster the growth of the economy, the well-being of the population, and the strengthening of the apparatuses put in place to maintain various forms of authority and rights, as well as protection of the state from external intrusions on its sovereignty.

Waever (1995) notes that by the height of the Cold War period, the practices and reasoning of the apparatuses with authority over security had developed into a domain of relations with its own patterns of communication, mutual activity, state and private institutions of public order and state defense, research institutions, sets of issues and agendas, rules of conduct, and professionals who claimed legitimate authorities in leading its activities. These elite professionals and entrepreneurs are firmly entrenched in their positions of power and deeply immersed in their own ways of reasoning and practice. Although there are variations in different historical moments and sociocultural contexts, Waever emphasizes that the defense of state sovereignty nevertheless always remains the central issue because, as these elites see it, if the sovereignty of a given state were to be undermined, the state would be defeated and would, in Waever’s (1995: 52) words, “find itself laid bare to imposition of the conqueror’s will.” In such a case, all other concerns in the society would become irrelevant because the state would no longer be in a position to resolve them. These elites reason that the security of the state should, therefore, always be the highest priority, with all other issues subordinated to this end, and a threat to state security must be addressed immediately with all the necessary means. In the case of the United States, for example, Bacevich (2007) shows that professionals
entrusted with the matters of state security have come to comprise a small group of professionals who form a closed circle of members keeping each other in power and reinforcing each others' views, legitimacy, and relevance with minimal regard to the democratic process of deliberation and decision making. Since World War II, Bacevich maintains, this security elite has come to believe that the survival of the American state is always at risk. Nelson (2007) documents how this rationale helped create a powerful complex of private and state institutions, dominated by private corporations and supported by academic research institutions, which are concerned with the production of means to maintain security. These elite are convinced that to be able to provide any level of security requires endless struggle and sacrifice on the part of the citizenry, constant preparation and readiness for war, and vigilant uncovering of secret plots and intentions of enemies of the state and its population.

The security apparatus and its mechanisms of management and control have emerged into a powerfully efficient system, capable of mobilizing populations on a huge scale to respond to what they label a security threat. The development of nuclear weapons and means to deliver them worldwide made the fear of threat to a nation more plausible. Anthropologist Joseph Masco (2006) describes, for example, how the invention of the atomic bomb at the U.S. nuclear research and experimental complex in Nevada, and the subsequent experimentation of its destructive potential, nurtured an environment in which the scientists perceived their work to be a part of a state of emergency in a country that could be a victim of a nuclear attack at any moment. This mentality was disseminated to the general public through the mass media as a form of collective fear in which the destructive power of the bomb could be imagined by envisioning one's home and city devastated by a nuclear explosion. Through various public spectacles in the form of large-scale exercises of responses to and televised visions of nuclear attacks, Masco (2008) suggests, the public internalized perceptions and feelings of insecurity and the need to give these issues a priority above any other public concerns. These mobilization exercises are also aided by the global system of technologically advanced mechanisms of control that are able to track, direct, and block the movement of people and information worldwide. Through these technological visions, it becomes possible to imagine how surveillance technology can help solve the security problem at all levels of social organization and successfully push for the interpretation of every problem as a security problem once such technological imaginary is possible (Bogard 1996). Other major military powers, such as Israel, subjected their own population to similar experiences of internalization of fear. This subjection helped the Israeli security complex develop what Kimmerling (1985) calls "routine security tension," which supports the social and institutional mechanisms that shift easily between routine daily life and a total mobilization against a perceived threat, as the decisions by the security apparatus demand. These mechanisms are grounded in conditions of emergency that are already deeply embedded in the everyday life of the Israelis. In this way, every crisis becomes an elaboration of already deeply internalized perceptions and behaviors of emergency.

How such activities are envisioned and strategies are conceived to preempt them are shrouded in secrecy, as security elites seem to have a distrust of the democratic process. This includes the elites in states where the choice of political organization is democracy and the actions of the government are subject to accountability to its citizens. At least in the case of the United States, Chesney (2007) suggests, secrecy seems to have been a part of the workings of the security apparatus since the state's inception. The centrality of secrecy for the functioning of the state, however, becomes particularly pronounced during what Bacevich (2007) calls the Long War. This refers to a reconfiguration of the mechanisms of security throughout the period that began in the last half of the previous century, beginning with World War II (1941–1945) as a truly global war, followed by the Cold War (1947–1989) as a standoff between two opposing global superpowers, a short post–Cold War intermission (1990–2001), and now the global War on Terror (post–September 11, 2001 [9/11]) as an amorphous, inconclusive, open-ended, and infinitely expandable pre-emptive violence to impose the vision of order by the security apparatus on a global scale.

The public is often reminded of the merits of secret operations of the apparatus. Chesney (2007: 1263–1266) states, for example, that this was also evoked after the Watergate crisis where President Richard Nixon used executive privilege to try to prevent a disclosure of transcripts of conversations by the White House that would implicate the president in the scandal. Shortly after the media revealed the surveillance scandal to the public, the U.S. attorney general delivered his address to the Association of the Bar of the City of New York on the topic of government secrecy. He reminded his listeners of how state secrecy helped end World War II, referring to the work of secret agents who were able to decode messages encrypted by the German machine, and argued that secrecy is needed by any state to acquire intelligence information to be able to efficiently perform its central function, which is providing security for its citizens. With the growing reliance on global market forces, deregulation, and privatization in the current global age, Sassen (2008: 168–184) demonstrates that secrecy has become a vehicle for restricting access to information by the public about the activities of the security apparatus, accumulation of executive powers and government authority, and erosion of privacy rights. We may say that the Long War, spanning from World War II through the Cold War into the War on Terror, has made secrecy an acceptable form of governing not only among the members of the state security apparatus but also among the citizenry.

For the purposes of planning, envisioning, or pre-empting human activity, these networks of apparatuses of security and their mechanisms depend on the ability to acquire information, classify and process that information,
and then effectively analyze it. Governmentality of potentialities is intimately dependent on continuous and methodical acquisition, accumulation, and processing of information about each individual and the collectivity as a whole. Today, the ever-improving technologies and techniques of surveillance generate enormous amounts of data that are channeled from numerous sources into centralized databases, often run by private firms. These data are continuously compiled and stored indefinitely for the purposes of data mining today and in the future, which means using sophisticated computer software to look for clues that help the apparatus envision even more possibilities of future threatening behavior. As I discuss elsewhere (Bajc 2007, 2010), information processing, combined with probabilistic thinking, makes it possible to profile individuals and groups into those who are safe and those who are potentially dangerous, those who may threaten security, and others who may not. Surveillance data combined with probabilistic analysis and profiling, Desrosières (1998) suggests, enable explanations about current human behavior and provide ideas on how that behavior may change in the future. They guide choices in terms of dealing with uncertainty, and offer tools to summarize otherwise unimaginable human diversity. They enable creation of categories through which the social world can be known, managed, and transformed by establishing a relation between social activity and the future. When security becomes a dominant ordering principle, analysis of surveillance data becomes the means to imagine and envision threats to security and conceive of strategies through which such events can be pre-empted.

To understand the dynamics associated with this rationale of governing and the rise of the security meta-framing, it is crucial to grasp the type of classification that underlies these mechanisms; namely, exclusionary classification. Classifications are frameworks through which we learn about the world and make sense of the social and natural environments around us. As far as we know, we are not able to think outside any particular classification, but how we classify the world does vary cross-culturally (Durkheim and Mauss 1963). This implies that classifications are cultural constructions we use all the time but rarely reflect on. These classifications guide our actions and thought, but we do not customarily think about them. They are means that help us think and act on the world rather than concepts we think about. What makes the task of analyzing this particular cultural logic of ordering practice even more challenging is the fact that the classification which underlies the workings of the security apparatus and its meta-framing is so pervasive that we take it for granted. It underlies the workings of state bureaucracy, provides impetus to the development of science, spurs technological innovations, and is also the basis of the operation of the Western legal system. For these reasons, it may be best to illuminate the logic of understanding the world through exclusionary classification and its consequences by a way of comparison.

Through exclusionary classification, we know the world by the principle of discrimination (see Handelman 2004: 19–28). When we try to identify phenomena and social activities, we look for elements that are their distinct representations; we create a category for such elements and then locate them within these established categories. Within each of these major categories, we then divide these elements into subcategories, and within each subcategory, into sub-subcategories, and so on, forming a hierarchical grid in such a way that each category subsumes all the ones below. In this way, we are able to assign every living and nonliving thing a distinct property and every such property a specific taxonomy. When we discover a new property for which no classification exists, we can simply invent one. Such hierarchies of classifications are purposefully created by a variety of professionals, such as statisticians representing population trends, scientists outlining the taxonomy of a particular species, or agents of the security apparatus analyzing surveillance data. Through exclusionary classification we take the complexity and the interconnectedness of everything that surrounds us and try to break it down into ordered hierarchies of distinct classes. We seek a priori generalizations to fit the huge diversity of phenomena and activities into predefined hierarchies of taxonomies in which each class frames the ones below. Such linear thinking also underlies security meta-framing, which I discuss in the following text.

An alternative way of understanding the world is to look not for distinctions but rather for connections. Such a principle of classification was articulated by philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953). Classification, through what he terms "family resemblances," seeks to connect the world through likenesses and interrelationships. Through this classification, we do not look for elements in a phenomenon or activity that have the same thing in common, nor do we make up a category and then put them into this category. When we look for connections, we do not create taxonomies with clear distinctions and fixed boundaries, such as safe and unsafe, secure and dangerous. Rather, we take a characteristic of a phenomenon and match it with a similar characteristic in an unrelated activity. In this way, our classification results in a series of relationships that connect one thing to another in a chain-like string where the totality of such connections has no one thing in common and does not connect all things at the same time. Such lateral thinking creates a network of overlapping similarities. This type of classification is closer to those created through tradition and reflexive practice, and as archaeologists suggest, approximates the knowledge of the ancients who sought explanations through connections rather than distinctions (Frankfort 1978). Russian developmental psychologist Lev Vygotsky (1962) describes such lateral thinking in children who group together objects that seem, to adults, inherently unrelated because they are not grouped on the basis of essential characteristics, but rather on complexes of associations in which a block is added to the chair because of a similar color, and the block and the chair to a book because of a similar shape. Exclusionary classification in which taxonomies are formed by grouping together elements...
with the same essential characteristics, Vygotsky concluded, must be taught by adults to be learned by children. Schools are, therefore, the primary institution in which linear thinking is thought and lateral perceptions discouraged.

Exclusionary classification also supports modern bureaucracy, enables the governmentality of potentialities, and underlies the security meta-framing. What makes the work of these mechanisms and apparatuses possible, Handelman (2004) suggests, is the systemic nature of their dynamics. These dynamics, he argues, are most powerful when the systematic becomes systemic in the way it is able to operate various forces in relation to one another. Exclusionary classification operates in such a way that it enables the information to be divorced from the human beings to whom it pertains. Once the information is detached from the person, the processing of that information can take on inertia of its own. Without regard for the actual human beings, data about them can be compiled, classified into any kind of categories the professionals see fit, and reclassified for any purpose. Each classification opens up possibilities to imagine and envision future human activity. So, too, for each classification, specifications can be devised for how to act on those visions and imaginaries to prevent them from happening. The over-perfected computer capabilities allow for ongoing accumulation of huge amounts of data, limitless storage of these data for the purposes of data mining, and analysis of these data with inventive software capabilities. In this way, the system is able to absorb and process any type and amount of information and then project future human behavior from that information without crisis. Because it is possible to extract identifiable information about any social phenomenon and classify that information into exclusionary categories at will, the system of governmentality of potentialities can be self-sustaining in that it is able to deal with ambiguity and need not encounter information blocks that would lead to its failure. Much of these dynamics occur away from the public eye, but when they do enter the public sphere they tend to take the form of security meta-framing. Like the bureaucratic system of the security mechanisms, security meta-frame is itself hierarchical, based on exclusionary classification and on discriminating between options rather than connections between them. The security meta-frame consists of a series of nested frames, which, as with the matryoshka doll, constitute a series of encompassing and encompassed levels of classification.

SECURITY META-FRAMING

The citizenry is rarely given an opportunity to evaluate security measures. There seems to be scant public education about the intricacies of the mechanisms put in place to exert control over public spaces, and little public debate on information gathering and analysis used for profiling citizens and noncitizens alike. The security apparatus values executive power to make swift decisions and secrecy over open public discussion and congressional debates, not the least, as Sassen (2008: 183–184) suggests, because the latter takes time and attracts public attention and in this way works against the urges for immediate preemptive action. When particular phenomena or activities the apparatus deems a potential threat to security are brought to the public domain, the information tends to be presented in such a way that the messages conveyed are to be interpreted by the public as either security or insecurity, where security becomes an obvious choice. The primary facilitator of this information to the public is the mass media. We are informed through detailed accounts about the personal life of suspected perpetrators, including their family background, education, work history, leisure habits, friendship circles, neighborhood relations, and religious practices. These are, we are told, ordinary people, liked by their neighbors, coworkers, and family, whose lives suddenly took the wrong turn. Meticulous descriptions are provided about how the security apparatus pieced together and reconstructed that path wrongly taken: meetings with certain people, trips abroad to particular countries, shifts in political views, changes in religious practices, and changes in personality. We have an opportunity to see maps and photographs of their intended activities with all that could have transpired if it were not prevented. We are actually provided with certain details about the prompt, preemptive, and forceful counteractivity of the apparatus through which, we are told, these intended activities were indeed prevented. We are also offered an evaluation of which technologies and techniques utilized in this case need to be perfected for the future. We are told that rules and regulations which fall within the legislative domain of the security apparatus will be made more stringent. At the same time, we are warned that this counteractivity could have been even more effective if human rights legislation were more flexible, more amenable to the swift preemptive activity of the apparatus. To give an example, in the summer of 2010, we were receiving information about Faisal Shahzad and explosive materials left in a car in Times Square, in the middle of New York City. As these details were released, we were also informed that the US attorney general was proposing a broad new exception to the Miranda rights established in 1966, which require that suspects be told that they have the right to remain silent and to consult a lawyer before their statements are used as evidence. At the same time we were told that the security apparatus advised that the no-fly list be checked much more frequently and much more attention paid to “the warning signs.”

Such information communicates messages that are meant to be interpreted by the public in meta-communicative terms; that is, as a logical choice between two distinct realities organized according to exclusionary premises—either security or insecurity. Security, characterized by order, safety, and well-being of everyone involved, is possible if the population embraces the measures of the security apparatus. The absence of security measures implies the alternative; namely, potential disorder, fear, uncertainty, and destruction. The two realities, security and insecurity, are made to be juxtaposed in exclusionary terms as either one or the other but never both, so that the context becomes
of less and less relevance in assigning or determining meaning. Communicated in this way, the security apparatus seeks public support in hopes that there would be little confusion on the behalf of the public over which reality is preferable. The purpose of providing this information in such a way seems to be for the public to identify security as meta-communicative to all other information received. With security seen as the highest of values and so the highest of levels, it determines meaning almost entirely in its own terms; that is, with the exclusion of context as a modifier of meaning. Through this, the meta-message of security becomes a frame that communicates how other messages received in relation to this frame are to be interpreted. The security meta-frame carries the message of order, which may be summarized thusly: to achieve safety and orderliness, it is necessary to control human interaction and human mobility through surveillance technologies and procedures, profiling, and pre-emptive action on behalf of the security apparatus. These measures may not always be convenient and may sometimes run against the democratic values, such as human rights and privacy, but they are the only way to achieve security. We will have security as long as the public does its best to comply with the measures implemented by the security apparatus.

Security meta-framing is grounded in exclusionary thinking and based on exclusionary classification that generates categories of human activity as either safe or dangerous, either enabling order or creating chaos. For this type of framing to communicate successfully, the interlocutors must be able to interpret the hierarchy of the information provided in such a way that the meta-message of security is habitually identified and the rest of the information understood in relation to the security meta-frame. In this manner, the thinking of the security apparatus is that the quest for security always overrides any concerns associated with the effects of surveillance and security measures. This is the kind of thinking the security apparatus seeks to impose on the public. This dynamic of security meta-framing and its shortcomings are perhaps best understood by legal scholars of privacy who are concerned about what they see as a trend of diminishing expectations of privacy on the part of the public (Cockfield 2007). They argue that with rapid expansion of surveillance technologies and techniques, coupled with data gathering, processing, and dissemination, the message of security has come to encompass that of privacy. This means that the message of security dictates how the message of privacy is to be received. In Bateson's terms, the message of privacy becomes subsumed within the hierarchy of classes of messages under the overarching umbrella of the message of security. According to Solove (2007), the message of security communicates that the state has the need to secure its own existence to be able to provide security for the population. The message of privacy communicates that the apparatus is collecting various kinds of information about people, including where we shop, where we travel, and whom we call, but if collecting such information helps the apparatus uncover people's bad intentions, it is a small price to pay in exchange for the protection of the state. The former is directed to the society as a whole while the latter is directed to each individual who is to see his or her own privacy interests in relation to the need for security by the state and the society as a whole. The public is able to identify security as the meta-message because the messages are communicated in such a way as to demand the hierarchical resolution of what is actually an ambiguous relationship. The complexities of each side are condensed to give the appearance of a binary opposition that can have only one correct outcome: privileging and therefore valuing security over privacy. This, however, means valuing all of the complexities and nuances of security over all those of privacy. The result is the totalization of the value of security over that of privacy. In this way, Solove (2007: 747) writes, privacy is made to appear like a trivial concern, "thus making the balance against security concerns a foreordained victory for security."

Security meta-framing works well when the information provided to the public is received in such a way that the hierarchy of messages is made as clear as possible so that ambiguity and confusion can be avoided. In Bateson's (1972b: 459) famous formulation, information "is a difference which makes a difference." This would mean that we are surrounded by infinite visual and auditory stimuli so that our sensory receptors cannot possibly register them all and must, therefore, filter them out. What does enter our mental processes from this limitless amount of stimuli are selected elements that make us aware that something has happened which is different in such a way that it actually made a difference in our lives. Such a change, Bateson suggests, becomes information. What we register as information, change, or difference depends on our personal experience, collective memory, and a particular sociohistorical context. In the post-9/11 world, information about security threats broadcast by the media makes a difference because it resonates with the images of destruction associated with the burning of the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York and, as Masco (2008) would suggest, imaginaries of "what could have happened" associated with the use of technological potentials of weapons of mass destruction by the wrong people. When the information provided no longer makes a difference, when it is no longer registered as the meta-message of security, it leads to confusion. In Bateson's terms, this is when the hierarchy of messages turns into a choice between two equal values, a binary choice between, for example, security or privacy—but not both. In terms of thinking by the security establishment, such a binary is evidence of failure on the part of the security apparatus, because it opens up a space for negotiation and mediatisation between the opposing binaries. When messages appear as binaries, confusion stems from the uncertainty about which one to choose. People find themselves unable to identify the hierarchy of messages and, through this, the meta-message that carries instructions about how to interpret other messages received. Such ambiguity renders problematic which messages communicate what and how the entirety of information is to be interpreted. Such confusion means inability to understand which messages communicate order and what is to be understood as insecurity. It seems to be this continuous, almost simultaneous, switching back and forth between
order and insecurity, safety and chaos that generates ambiguity and creates uncertainty. This opens up a space for contestation, questioning, and deliberation on the part of the public. In conditions of binary opposition, both poles of the binary are on the same level of abstraction and so, of the same value. The theory of logical types obviates this by insisting on hierarchy between the poles, hierarchy that encompasses the poles within a higher meta-level or class. From the standpoint of security thinking, binaries or multiplicities on the same level of abstraction are rejected because this denies and negates the basis for control by security.

To make sense of these dynamics of switching between contradictory orders of messages where one denies the other, Bateson (1956) envisions this situation as a logical paradox of the self-referential variety. A logical paradox, Wilder and Collins (1994: 87) explain, “always arise[s] from a problem posed and found to be unsolvable within the frame of given axiomatic systems.” Paying attention to paradox, they suggest, exposes a number of taken-for-granted assumptions about rationality in the Western philosophical traditions, as well as the Western conventional wisdom. In the Western tradition, ideas are evaluated on the basis of binary truth—they are either true or they are false, but they cannot be true and false at the same time. As a matter of comparison, Wilder and Collins point out that, in the Eastern thought, paradox does not represent a concern because paradoxical statements stand as a form of truth in themselves, an opportunity to grow and create, rather than an inconsistency to be corrected. In the practice of Zen Buddhism, what the Western view would call a paradox is used as a teaching device to reach the path to enlightenment. The Chinese and the Japanese languages seem to have no concept that approximates the notion of the paradox as it is known in the Western philosophy. Our understanding of paradox, Wilder and Collins write, is related to the Western privileging of human reason and utopian visions of order rather than the embracing of perplexity, indeterminacy, and ambiguity in human behavior. Paradoxes are, therefore, analytically very interesting because they help us understand culturally and contextually specific responses.

An often-mentioned example of paradox of the self-referential variety is the one posited by Epimenides: “All Cretans are liars.” Epimenides was himself a Cretan, so with this statement he wanted to demonstrate an example of an illogical, nonsensical, contradictory message because if it is true that all Cretans are liars, then we must not be telling the truth. But if he is telling the truth, then he must be lying. Because the premise of this reasoning is the either/or logic (i.e., the statement is either true or false but cannot be both), to make sense of this communication one is running in circles. Batesen (1956) draws inspiration from these contradictory premises to envision the relationship between communication and meta-communication and relies on the theory of logical types to articulate this communicative relationship through the notion of framing. Philosophers and mathematicians Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell (1910) argue that the communication by Epimenides contains two different levels of abstraction: the class

“the Cretans,” denoting those who live on the island of Crete, and the actual people on the island. Their solution is to change the value of one category in relation to the other, thereby creating a hierarchy of value. Following their reasoning, a class—in this case, the Cretans—cannot be a member of the class of the phenomena it denotes, here being the actual people living on the island, because the class is of a higher logical type than the phenomena it denotes. In terms of meta-communication, the class encompasses, subsumes, and orders its members. The members do not order the class. Epimenides, a member of the class of Cretans, therefore, should not be caught in self-referential paradox, because the class, in this case, liars, should not be confused with a member of that class, here, Epimenides the Cretan who may or may not be a liar.

When the juxtaposition of security and insecurity does not lead to security meta-framing—that is, when the meta-message of security is not recognized and so security is not identified as the value, higher than any other—a contradiction between the messages is exposed. This becomes obvious when juxtaposition of the choice between messages of security and insecurity becomes exposed as a paradox, illuminating an unbearable situation in which we think that we are in a position in which whatever we choose will result in an intolerable loss. If we choose to entrust our lives to the protection of the security apparatus and its surveillance technologies and procedures, our privacy, freedom of movement, and human rights are seriously undermined. But if we reject these measures to keep our freedoms, we expose ourselves to the mercy of people who may have destructive intentions. Matters of safety and well-being are vitally important to our lives, so rather than ignoring the paradox as unproblematic, the public feels compelled to respond. We must choose a meta-communicative message because it is crucial that we distinguish accurately what kinds of messages are being communicated and yet we are not able to distinguish between the logical types of the messages we receive because one set of messages denies the others. Bateson (2000b) calls this situation a double bind, a binding relationship from which it may be difficult to escape.

In some cases, Bateson (2000b) notes, a double bind can stimulate creativity and spontaneity and lead to novel solutions. Such is the case with learning in Zen Buddhism where the master may use double binds to encourage movement along the path toward enlightenment. Bateson (2000b: 208) describes an example where the master holds a stick over the student’s head and says authoritatively: “If you say this stick is real, I will strike you with it. If you say the stick is not real, I will strike you with it. If you do not say anything, I will strike you with it.” A student may react spontaneously, instinctively, or even reflexively by simply reaching up to the master’s hand, getting hold of the stick, and just taking it away from the master. Such an outcome is possible under certain conditions. This student is unburdened by fear of authority and liberated from the limitation to think in binary terms. The master would not see this reaction as a ridicule of the master’s authority or dismissal of an intention to communicate a set of important messages to the student. The master is
actually trying to teach such emancipation, freedom, and spontaneity and would, therefore, see this as the student's step closer to enlightenment.

In meditation and often also in therapy (see Wilder and Collins 1994), double binds are intentionally created by authoritative figures to help individuals overcome such paradoxical situations. This, however, is not the case with double binds that result from the failure of security meta-framing. Because security meta-framing involves a bureaucratic system of a state apparatus and is predicated on binary classification, a way out of a double bind calls for a hierarchical solution. Such a solution means to identify among the messages communicated a meta-message that interpreted all others. This means receiving additional information that will, in the eyes of the public, make a difference. According to Handelman (1992), such new information enables a change in values given to the contradictory messages. It generates a new understanding, which has the capacity to change the value assigned to the self-negating messages in such a way that it establishes a hierarchy between the messages. Once the messages are hierarchically organized in relation to one another, one set of messages is able to emerge as a message at a meta-level in relation to the others.

Security meta-framing in relation to privacy in the context of law offers another interesting possibility. As currently interpreted in legal terms, privacy is the right of an individual and defined through a common denominator which comprises sufficient and necessary elements that demarcate what privacy is and clearly separates privacy from other concerns (see Cockfield 2007). In this way, and coupled with the perception by the public that diminished privacy rights is a small price to pay for security, the information about the loss of privacy in relation to surveillance and other security measures is not likely to be received by the public and the courts alike in meta-communicative terms or lead to a double bind. For this reason, Solove (2008) proposes to break away from exclusionary classification of privacy and to instead conceptualize privacy through a plurality of connections between different aspects of life so that a clear-cut decision between privacy and security would not be possible. By focusing on sufficient conditions, one is forced to include and exclude various aspects of life in which privacy is present, and in this way misses its various forms. Through Wittgenstein's family resemblance theory, Solove shows how it becomes possible to see that privacy has many dimensions, each related to different aspects of social and individual life in such a way that one affects the other and the overall quality of life of the whole community. In this way, it is possible to identify many specific aspects of privacy in different situations without the burden of adhering to a unifying common denominator. Privacy becomes a cluster of distinct things, situations, and dimensions of experience that are related through a chain of interconnections rather than one common denominator. Understood in such terms, the public would be able to see the multiple dimensions of privacy as intimately and inseparably related to the quality of life of the entire society in which no one dimension of privacy could be singled out as unnecessary in relation to the value of security.

When no spontaneous or instinctive reaction is achieved, no outside interference is introduced, and so no new information that makes a difference is acquired, Bateson envisions a situation that leads to systematic distortions and eventual self-destruction. A repeated and prolonged exposure to double binds, Bateson and others argue, leads to schizophrenia (Ruesch and Bateson 1951). In a schizophrenic situation, the ongoing contradiction becomes emotionally burdening, making people oscillate between love for security and hate of the loss of privacy, love for democracy but hate toward a particular classification of individuals. When the public cannot sort out the messages, people become overburdened and emotionally overloaded, and may react in extreme ways described as paranoia. Without the ability to find a solution, Bateson (2000b: 211–212) writes, the public becomes "like any self-correcting system which has lost its governor; it spirals into never-ending, but always systematic, distortions." One could argue that this means the abdication of democracy on the part of the citizenry.

THE CHAPTERS

This volume is a cross-national and interdisciplinary mix of original and thought-provoking empirical and conceptual contributions of case studies from different parts of the world. The chapters are divided into four sections, which follow this introductory discussion, and conclude with summary remarks by Willem de Lint. In Part I, Public Spaces and Collective Activities, we begin with two contexts in which the dynamics of security meta-framing are extremely intensified and, therefore, very visible: airports and state-sponsored public events. These two cases allow us to study how the apparatus envisions the social reality of security, the process through which such social reality is constructed, and the maintenance of this reality through self-correcting behavior on the part of the public. In both cases, it is essential for the security apparatus to avoid any ambiguity in communication so that the meta-message of security can be identified immediately and without confusion by the people involved. In these securitized spaces, there is little tolerance for any social behavior that has the potential to generate uncertainty and indeterminacy. Mark Salter discusses one example of such behavior; namely, joking. The "no-joking" signs at the airports suggest that the security apparatus is aware of the potentials of humor. Humor opens up a possibility of questioning or exposing the arbitrariness of the social order at the airport envisioned and imposed by the security apparatus. Its prohibition tries to ensure that no social context is created in which people boarding an airplane would question the underlying assumption that the extreme control measures at the airport are for the good of the people and that the security experts know best how to protect them. The attempt to eliminate humor from this social space is an effort to avoid a double-bind, that is, an effort to avoid a situation where the security-insecurity paradox
would be exposed because the meta-message of security would not be identified. Humor, Bateson (1953) argues, makes us laugh precisely because its symbolism leads us through a thought process that works by way of contradiction and ambiguity to be able to arrive at the punch line. When passing through the checkpoint, for example, passengers are expected to follow the rules: take off their shoes, put their belongings on the conveyer belt, and walk through the metal detector. If a sound is released by the machine, the passenger is ordered to step back, remove from his or her body what ever elements are thought to be triggering the sound, and then walk through the metal detector again. This is to be repeated for as long as the metal detector is releasing the sound. If, during such a moment, a joke is shared between the passengers and a security operative and the joke makes people laugh, a double bind may potentially be created. The operative is put in a position where he or she must effectively distinguish between a truthful intent and a harmless joke – but is unable to do so. On their part, the passengers, during the shared moments of laughter collectively ignore the operative's requests and – like the student of Zen Buddhism mentioned earlier – grab their luggage off the conveyer belt, put their shoes back on, and bypass the metal detector. The prohibition of humor seeks to eliminate such situations. In the social reality of security as designed by the security apparatus, there is little tolerance for alternative realities and little acceptance for other ways of being in the world. The airport is an example of a social space within which the security apparatus makes every effort to indefinitely maintain the reality of security.

How does social reality of security come to exist? Using the case of the visit of the late Pope John Paul II to Jerusalem, I demonstrate, step-by-step, the process through which such reality is constructed in the context of public events. Public events are collective activities that, for the duration of the event, are able to reorder social life according to their own script. Their temporary, often cyclical, nature allows us to observe the process of transformation of social life in a public space from everyday routine living, to a social reality of the event, and then back to the routine life. For these reasons, such events offer themselves as empirically rich and analytically fruitful phenomena for the study of the epistemology of security meta-framing in its actual affects on social life. Using detailed ethnographic data, I show that this process involves a total transformation of everyday life for the duration of the event. The purpose of this reordering of social life is to eliminate uncertainty from the living environment as best as possible and establish a social space of maximum control. The process begins when a public event is classified by the apparatus as an activity that can potentially be a threat to security. With this classification, the apparatus takes over the public space in which the event is to be staged, encircles the space with an impenetrable boundary, separates insiders from outsiders and the safe from the dangerous, creates a sterilized zone of safety, and reorders the movement of people within the enclosure. All available resources are mobilized to this end, and the public is expected to adjust its routine daily life according to the rules of the apparatus. I make a provocative argument that, if we analytically separate the process of re-ordering performed by the security apparatus from the performance of the actual public event, we see that the process of security meta-framing of reality of safety has a ritual form. The implication is that through the form of ritual, the performance of surveillance in the name of security gains legitimacy and acceptance in the eyes of the public. What I call “security meta-ritual” effectively avoids the double bind by communicating to the public that it is in the interest of everyone involved that the public event unfolds without disturbance. Every successful performance of the security meta-ritual reinforces its meta-constitution in relation to whichever public event it seeks to protect and re-establishes the hierarchy of maximum control through security over the uncertainty of everyday life.

Part II, Struggle and Resistance, offers two examples in which the security meta-framing is effectively questioned with analytically very interesting outcomes. The first case details resistance of one person, while the second presents us with a group struggle. Interestingly, as the two chapters illustrate, the notion of security seems to be a powerful cultural construct, as in neither case does facing a security–insecurity paradox lead to negating the value of security all together. Nevertheless, it does seem to open up a space for alternative visions of social reality. Liora Sion presents a case of an Israeli-born Jewish woman by the name of Tali Fahima who fails to identify security as the meta-communicative message and begins to question the security meta-frame as it is lived in Israel/Palestine. At some point in Fahima's life, the information she has been receiving from the Israeli institutions on such issues as education, religion, the media, and the military, as well as various other constituents of the security apparatus, no longer seems self-evident, so she finds herself in a double bind. As Sion describes, Fahima is confused; she has always been told that Palestinians do not belong to the state of Israel but now she sees that Palestinians are actually human beings and that she, as an Israeli, is partly responsible for the path their lives have taken. Fahima's reaction to her discovery of this paradox is to seek more information from alternative sources. On her own and apart from any of the established channels, she commences Internet conversations with Arabs and Palestinians, invites Palestinians for a visit to her home, and initiates meetings with Palestinians in a refugee camp. Through this activity, she begins to blur the clear-cut boundaries between us and them, the good and the bad, the safe and the dangerous—classifications, established and enforced by the Israeli state security apparatus. As is the case with any such bureaucratic system, the working of the Israeli security apparatus is predicated on clearly defined classifications—for example, religious, secular, Palestinian, Israeli, Muslim, Jewish, Christian, peacenik, and terrorist—and the system is not capable of dealing with the ambiguities Fahima has created. Not surprisingly, the response of the apparatus has been to try to reorient Fahima, to force her back into the designated taxonomies; that is, taxonomies with which the security apparatus operates. Fahima is told that she must choose between any of the available categories: be a loyal Israeli or go
and live with the Palestinians. She is pressured, harassed, interrogated, tried in court, imprisoned, publically humiliated by the apparatus and the mass media alike, and abandoned by the Israeli public. The goal is to force her to succumb to the security meta-frame from which she sought to escape. The case is ongoing, and Fahima is unpredictable. As of this writing, Fahima has been abandoned by the Israelis but accepted by the Palestinians. She recently converted to Islam and currently lives in a Palestinian town.

Kathleen Staudt presents a case of security meta-framing of the U.S.-Mexico border and the articulation of a collective resistance to its tendencies. The stretch of nearly 2000 miles is a culturally diverse, socially vibrant, and economically interdependent area, populated by people of Hispanic, European, and Native American descent, among others. With the classification of border migration as a security threat, the border area is beginning to resemble a military zone, where concrete wall, watch towers, barbed wire, night vision cameras, movement sensors, endless other surveillance technologies, and untold numbers of border control operatives work to achieve maximum control over migration through the area. The social consequences of this fortification of the border are an example of the power of security meta-framing to reorder social life. Its effects penetrate physically, socially, culturally, and emotionally through the closely knit and interdependent local communities. As Staudt details, the bureaucratic arm of the security apparatus reaches deep into this social fabric, severing families, relatives, coworkers, and friends through exclusionary classifications. Security meta-framing is forcing people in a position where they are asked to choose their loyalties between their kin or their state. Particularly the Hispanic population, however, is well aware of the security-insecurity paradox. Yet, in this poverty-stricken region, dominated by the minority of white Anglos, resistance has taken time to build momentum. Recently, Hispanics have been elected to public office, nongovernmental organizations established to provide legal counsel to immigrants, and documentaries filmed to record harassment by the U.S. Border Patrol agents. There have been lawsuits, school walkouts, and civil disobedience to block the construction of the border wall. Interestingly, as Staudt shows, this resistance is not articulated against the value of security. Rather, the questioning of the security meta-frame is leading in the direction of a struggle over how to define security as the meta-message. From the standpoint of the state apparatus, terrorism puts the survival of the nation at risk and must be counteracted by using military means. Those who resist this meta-message, on the other hand, are articulating their counteractivities as the struggle for human security. This entails a mix of values including human rights, individual freedom from state intrusion, respect for constitutional rights, and faith-based principles. Whereas the double bind opens up a space for a battle over who should determine what the classification of security should actually entail, Staudt suggests that the security meta-framing by the

state apparatus nevertheless seems to hold firmly, winning over the local articulations of human security.

The power of the state and its security apparatus to have control over security meta-framing is grounded in the ability to classify and re-classify individual behavior at will. This power is enhanced through televised demonstrations of the state's ability to pre-empt visions of chaos and destruction, the practice of secrecy, and pressures to modify legal norms to accommodate the needs of the apparatus. In Part III, Law, Citizenship, and the State, contributors demonstrate how the push for security as the dominant value through what I described earlier as governmentality of potentialities have been undermining the very basis of democratic principles of the modern state, the rule of law and the relationship between the citizen and the state. As Willem de Lint discusses, mass-mediated demonstrations of successful pre-emptive activity by the apparatus are crucial for their legitimacy in the eyes of the public. The public expects action on the part of the apparatus, lest it be thought of as "weak on security." At the same time, particularly in a democratic state, the apparatus is expected to demonstrate to the public that it is taking action in the face of chaos and uncertainty. Each reinforces the other so that, as Masco (2008) would suggest, both resonate with the collective memories on the part of the public and the apparatus alike of the destructive potentials of technologies in the hands of the wrong people. In Bateson's terms, this opens up a space of tolerance on the part of the public not only for secrecy but also for normalization of the so-called "exceptional security measures" by the apparatus.

Reem Bahdi documents the case of a number of Arabs and Muslims who came to be secretly classified as terrorists by the security apparatus of Canada and treated in violation of the law. She details several examples: the Canadian state apparatus was directly implicated in handing its own citizens and residents into the hands of the apparatus of another state, its denizens were kept in solitary confinement in Canadian jails for months without legal counsel, and individuals were confined to their homes through house arrest during which their family members were forced to surveil and police them. When these cases entered the public sphere and the lawyers began preparing lawsuits against the state, the apparatus simply created a new classification that denied the right to sue the state and labeled those who sought to claim such rights unpatriotic and therefore a national security threat. Bahdi concludes that there may be variations in the way apparatuses of different states with democratic political organizations support the meta-message of security when extraordinary measures are employed in the case of terrorism suspects. Although the United States publicly claims that extraordinary measures are necessary in exceptional times, such claims are rarely publically made by the Canadian state. Instead, the Canadian apparatus claims that individual rights should be balanced in relation to collective rights so that if individual rights threaten the collectivity, individual protections should give way to the well-being of the group.
In the case of Western law, writes King (1993), any social issue or event that requires determination by the court has to be decided in binary terms, legal or illegal. These categories are mutually exclusive so that social activity cannot be simultaneously interpreted as lawful or unlawful. To be considered a part of the scope of law—that is, to fall within the boundaries of the legal system—any social practice, no matter how complex, needs to be coded in these binary terms and must be formulated in such a way that it can be arbitrated as either in accordance with the law or against the law.

Gabe Mythen analyzes the case of counterterrorism legislation in the United Kingdom. The new legislation seeks to legalize the governmentality of potentialities; that is, the tendency of the apparatus to act preemptively rather than arbitrate over an act already committed. This legislation, Mythen shows, is based on imaginaries of some abnormal human activity in the future and on anticipation of worst-case scenarios. The public expects that the governing institutions will act. The state apparatus is pushing to bend the existing law and to undermine the existing regulation to be able to act swiftly, bypassing the checks and balances currently in place. Through this push for new legislation, certain fundamental grounds of Western law are undermined, including the right to remain silent under questioning, the right to be released when charges have been pressed, and the maxim that an individual is innocent until proven guilty of an actual unlawful activity.

Chapters in Part IV (Global Agendas, Local Transformations) demonstrate how the totalizing nature of the security meta-frame, as it expands globally, is able to define the parameters and the conditions of how everyday life should be lived at very micro-levels in three different parts of the world: the European Union (EU), Latin America, and China. Supra Virta documents the ambition by the governing bodies of the EU to impose homogeneous, unionwide surveillance measures on the populations of the member states in light of the new classification of "homogenized terrorism." Included in this new taxonomy is a specification that this type of terrorism can appear in any of the states of the EU, that visible signs of such "growth" include "radical behavior" and "recruitment," and that the apparatus must act on these signs to pre-empt and prevent whatever human activity may transpire as a result of this. The signs that communicate to the apparatus what entails radical behavior are interpreted through what Foucault (2003) analyzed as the understanding by the apparatus of what constitutes abnormal individual thought and lifestyle. Clues include changes in social, religious, or political convictions; refusal to shake a woman's hand; or changes in appearance such as growing a beard or wearing a particular kind of clothing. This new classification, Virta suggests, is administered through a highly centralized and bureaucratized security apparatus that is dominated by the police, intelligence organizations, and secret service institutions with limited language skills and cultural knowledge to interpret intentions of individuals in the culturally and socially highly diverse population of Europe. The security meta-frame, she suggests, nevertheless resonates locally due to people's growing sense of fear.

Cultural behavior, Jiang Fei and Huang Kuo argue, is also at the center of security concerns in China where the state is anxious that the younger generations may be embracing cultural ways of the West, thereby relinquishing the Maoist traditions of discipline and respect of authority. In its ambition to dominate the global economy, the Chinese state had no choice but to join the global capitalist economic circles. By opting to embrace capitalism, China was forced to open its doors to multinational corporations, including what Fei and KuO call transnational media corporations. To create a new market for their goods among the Chinese, corporations such as Disney, Time Warner, and others have been eager to promote the culture of consumption and consumer spending as well as the Western values associated with individualism. The Chinese state fears that, what Baudrillard (1981) calls the "seduction of the symbols of capitalism," will lure the Chinese youth away from the value of the Chinese version of socialism and its Maoist traditions. The result has been a not-so-subtle power struggle over the hearts and the minds of the Chinese, which the Chinese state is trying to articulate through the security meta-frame. Fei and KuO use the ancient Chinese teachings on the art of war (Lian Heng and He Zong) to demonstrate these dynamics between the anxious Chinese state and the ambitious foreign media corporations. In their provocative analogy of the similarities between ancient Chinese war strategies and the contemporary securitization of culture by the state, Fei and KuO illustrate how this struggle influences the lives of the Chinese people.

Nelson Arteaga Botello documents a similar expansionist ambition of the security meta-framing of everyday living, this one by the United States over the entire region of the Americas. Through two foreign aid policies, the Merida Initiative and the Columbia Plan, the U.S. Congress seeks to implement a security and economic infrastructure over the entire region. This top-down imposition, Botello shows, has had particular effects on the ground. In the fast-growing Latin American urban centers, he suggests, social inequality, underemployment, and neighborhood crime loom large so that people are seeking protection. Rather than improving the grossly inadequate social services, however, it is the surveillance practices of the security apparatus that are being put in place instead. Military and police surveillance permeates down to neighborhood relations, reshaping the social fabric as well as the physical landscape of these communities along class and racial lines. The public space is being carved into zones and corridors of intensive protection for those with the means. Neighborhood watch groups, private guards, and sophisticated surveillance technologies protect the well-being of the privileged residents who are housed in walled-off gated neighborhoods, who work and shop in zoned-off commercial districts, and are able to move from zone to zone through carefully surveilled routes. The exterior of this grid is left to violence, malnutrition, crime, and fear of open
spaces. The boundary is maintained not only by the apparatus but also by the privileged residents who are encouraged to work closely with the apparatus and report any of their observations of abnormal behavior. Here, in the absence of effective social services or strong kinship or communal ties, the globalizing tendency of the security meta-frame meets the communal needs for safety and economic well-being.

As Willem de Lint discusses in his concluding remarks, with the empirical evidence and its accompanying theoretical reflections, this volume is a contribution to what is emerging as a research agenda on the dynamics associated with treating a wide variety of social activities and phenomena in everyday life as a threat to security. Attention to these issues was first given by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and colleagues at the Peace Research Institute at the University of Copenhagen. Today, their scholarship is referred to as the Copenhagen School. Their efforts have sparked a very diverse set of approaches and research initiatives, among others in France (e.g. Bigo 2002; Balzacq 2005) and in Canada (e.g. de Larrinaga and Salter 2010). The introduction of security meta-framing derived from the communications theory of Bateson offers this research agenda a framework to theorize in historical and cultural-comparative terms at micro and macro levels how the security imperative is shaping the conditions of possibility of how everyday life is articulated through practice as well as through thought.

NOTES

1. For an overview of the extensive scholarship of Gregory Bateson and its contemporary significance, see biographies by Charlton (2008) and Lipset (1980).

2. The Long War is a central theme in the Cold War espionage novels of John Le Carré who was, in his early career, himself a former spy for MI5.


4. A review of this scholarship is beyond the scope of my argument here. For most recent work see Buzan and Waever (2009, 2007); Buzan and Hansen (2009); Stritzel (2007); and Williams (2003).