Introduction

Debating Surveillance in the Age of Security

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The practice of surveillance under the meta-frame of security is based on acquiring ever more detailed information and parceling out the state territory into different types of enclosures. The state seeks flexibility to follow this information globally and in real time. To be able to act in preemptive ways, the state is reshaping its Weberian bureaucratic structure through internal reorganization, outsourcing, and suprastate security alliances. These developments threaten the relationship between the citizen and the state and raise ethical concerns.

Keywords: surveillance; bureaucratic classification; bureaucratic logic; governmentality of potentialities; corporate security state; Outsider; checkpoint; zone of sovereignty; ethics

This volume is a contribution to the growing field of surveillance studies, a research agenda gaining momentum with the increasing public awareness of surveillance practices and concern about security. Innovative and multidisciplinary approaches cross the boundaries between critical security studies, studies of policing, immigration research, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, geography, political science, history, communications, and cultural studies. Each brings to the discussion its own understanding of power, control, mobility, modern culture, and technology. Together, they address a series of questions: What is surveillance? What forms does it take in different situations and contexts? What is the relationship between surveillance and security? How is the practice of surveillance related to scientific and technological development? How is it changing our social life, our notions of private and public, and our conceptions of public spaces? What are the cultural bases for the development and expansion of surveillance? What are the ethical consequences of these practices? How can social theory inform our understanding of these developments?

The increasing scholarly interest in these issues has produced a number of collections of articles that provide insightful reviews of this literature from different

Author’s Note: This essay benefits from the comments of John Torpey. I thank Charles Tilly for his support of this project. My understanding of security and surveillance continues to develop through ongoing conversations with Don Handelman. Please address correspondence to Vida Bajc, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6299; phone: 215-898-2418; e-mail: vbajc@ssc.upenn.edu.
perspectives, most recently Lyon (2002, 2006), Monahan (2006), and Zureik and Salter (2005). Current substantive and theoretical issues on this topic are published in the online journal Surveillance and Society. We contribute to this debate with five studies that cover a broad range of social contexts in which surveillance is practiced in order to respond to concerns about security. Through the broad scope of these studies we wish to draw attention to a particular kind of classification and its epistemology that underlie the notion of surveillance. The purpose of my introduction to this special issue is to show how these ways of understanding and acting on the world provide the basis for surveillance and guide its practice. With this aim, my discussion outlines the relationship between biopolitics and the cosmology of modernity, suggests how bureaucratic classification and its logic of practice enable the processing of huge amounts of information, and shows how surveillance positions the individual into a new relationship with the state. I begin by summarizing each of the studies to emphasize themes and issues that are manifestations of this logic of practice.

In “The Fight Against Illegal Migration,” Dennis Broeders and Godfried Engbersen (2007 [this issue]) present issues surrounding people within the territory of the European Union (EU) who are not classified as legal residents. This includes those who overstayed their tourist visas, undocumented laborers, refugees, and those traveling over EU territory with false documents. Once migrants cross the border, some destroy their documents to erase traces of their migration history and their state of origin and seek black market bureaucratic identity of the new state. Others choose to take on whatever ethnic identities are legally more privileged by a particular state in the EU and hope to gain some kind of legal status on the basis of such identity. As a response, the EU has been fortifying its border with efforts to prevent such migration, seeking to locate these migrants to expel them from the territory. This agenda is frustrated by migrants’ refusal to cooperate as well as by the legislation with which each state within the EU is obliged to comply. The states’ solution to these restrictions has been to detain migrants in detention centers, sovereign zones of confinement outside the legal domain and in unknown locations, within which these migrants are subjected to prison regime and practices of extraction of information. This information will allow the surveillance operatives to track, monitor, and block subsequent movement of these migrants across state territories. Working outside the law enables the operatives to bypass the binding legal procedures and operate according to their own rules.

“The Simulation of Crime Control,” by Willem de Lint, Sirpa Virta, and John Deukmedjian (2007 [this issue]), is an analysis of how this policy to locate these individuals within a state territory rather than while they are crossing the border interferes with the nature of work of different law agencies. The traditional role of law enforcement is to resolve cases and act only after the crime has been committed, whereas the role of the immigration and border police is preventive and based on intelligence information. Under the new imperative of security—when every issue has come to be seen as a threat to the sovereignty of the state and the well-being of
its citizens—every individual is now potentially a threat, so the work of different types of agencies is now directed toward the new goal of providing security. The authors suggest that this blurring of roles under the security imperative is bringing about a change in policing strategies, from community-based, consensual order-keeping to preventive operations based on secrecy. The practice of security is based on exclusive knowledge that is not to be disclosed to the public. With much of policing now done away from the public eye, the practice of policing and its legitimacy rely on mass-mediated representations to demonstrate to the public that the policing work is effective, legitimate, and in the interest of the local community and the larger society.

“Surveillance in Public Rituals,” by Vida Bajc (2007 [this issue]), is a study of how the power of surveillance makes itself known to the public during public events. The case of the second inauguration of President George W. Bush in 2005 in Washington, D.C., shows how all possible institutions, agencies, and resources, including the media, were mobilized to work together toward the common goal of securing the area where the inaugural events took place. The general public was discouraged from participating in various ways and only ticket holders were able to attend the inaugural events. The surveillance apparatus treated all participants as potentially dangerous so that each and every person was made to go through one of the several checkpoints that marked the entryway into the zone of safety, and at those checkpoints, persons and their belongings were inspected individually. For the state and its apparatus, this is a creative process through which a new social reality of safety is brought to existence for the duration of a public event. This process has a ritual form which subordinates all other activity within its domain. Through this security meta-ritual, safe is separated from everything potentially dangerous. Within this newly created zone of safety, public activities are able to unfold without intentional interruption.

“Customs Regimes and the Materiality of Global Mobility,” by Brenda Chalfin (2007 [this issue]), details how customs operations of the transoceanic trade work at the Dutch seaport of Rotterdam, whose stretch of 40 kilometers along the North Sea makes it the world’s largest port, with a trade volume capacity ranked seventh. Here, the neoliberal push of the last half century meets the new security imperative, and the forces of free trade face the power of the state. Although seaports in some parts of the world have been privatized to a large degree, its long maritime history has given the Netherlands an advantaged position, allowing the state to remain in control over the balance between the security objective and market forces. Whereas in the case of public events the security meta-frame subjects every object and participant to individual security check, in the case of Rotterdam, less than 2% of the huge volume of cargo which passes through the port is physically inspected. Nevertheless, many resources are devoted to this form of surveillance, if only for symbolic reasons, in order to demonstrate that it can be done. Most of the cargo inspection, however, is not done on the site. It is performed at a distance and on the basis of information assessment about the goods on board. All entry information about the goods and the shippers is received by the port authorities prior to the ship’s arrival.
at the harbor. The officials also rely on information about the shippers, importers, and their agents from a vast number of databases and customs intelligence. It is through analysis of the information pertaining to the cargo that the customs authorities make decisions about which cargo may enter the port.

In “Human Trafficking, Information Campaigns, and Strategies of Migration Control,” Céline Nieuwenhuys and Antoine Pécoud (2007 [this issue]) demonstrate a very different approach to the rising level of human mobility, particularly that of the nonprivileged segments of the world population. Countries in the EU use public campaigns to extend their control of migration into the state territories of potential migrants. The goal is to prevent people from leaving their home environments through messages that portray images of the future that awaits those who may be thinking of crossing the border to Europe: women abused by human traffickers, deplorable conditions inside European detention centers, job promises by fictional employers, and slogans that proclaim those who leave their home environment for Europe as failures. In a strange twist of history, these campaigns now seek to undo half a century of the cold war propaganda that promised a better life for those who made it to the promised land in the West. Here, state power works not through coercion but through discipline. This discipline is aimed at keeping people in place, locking them into their individual fate in their place of origin, and destroying their hopes for a better life elsewhere. It is a form of self-discipline based on local communal and cultural norms of shame that may be brought to bear on a person whose aspirations have turned into failure.

The themes and issues I have highlighted above speak to the practices of surveillance under the imperative of security. While surveillance has indeed become closely related to security, the two nevertheless have very different genealogies through which their centrality was able to emerge. For this reason, each should be studied in its own right so that their relationship can be more clearly understood. I begin with the foundational premises of surveillance that were developed through forms of governmentality that emerge in the territorially based modern state through its ability to manage different components of life of each particular citizen. I then suggest how this infrastructure develops its own epistemology, its own ordering logic, its own ways of understanding and acting on the world, through which it is possible to continue to perfect surveillance technologies and practices in the hopes of not only managing life in the present but also controlling how social life will take shape in the future. The aim of this introduction is to promote discussion about the genealogies of surveillance and the logic of its practices.

**Biopolitics as a Form of Governmentality**

The modern state is focused on managing the population within its borders and maintaining territorial sovereignty in relation to other states. Internally, this means
systematic gathering of information on each individual to allow for mobilization of the population for the state’s purposes (Desrosières, 1998). Externally, state governance is focused on securing its territorial sovereignty through military means and state defense policies related to the global system of modern states (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998). This kind of population control is based on clear differentiation between what is within the state boundary and what remains outside the enclosure through officially designated penetration points at which movements into and out of the state are officially sanctioned through specific documentation issued for these purposes (Salter, 2003; Torpey, 2000). This becomes possible when people who make up population groups are thought of as individuals in relation to each other and to the state.

Indeed, for the modern state, governing becomes the power to turn a social body of people into a group of individuals and turn those individuals into subjects that can be governed. A social body of people related through kinship or communal ties has its own internal structure of relations, morals, loyalties, and hierarchies so that their ways of living and being in the world make sense within their in-group relations. Such populations of related and connected persons make it impossible for the state to manage and control them effectively. Therefore, each kinship group needs to be made into a group of individuated persons, that is, each group member needs to be distinguished from all others and reduced to his or her own self. Once individuated in this way, they can be turned into subjects who can be governable through what Foucault (1980b) refers to as biopolitics. This is a type of governmentality based on surveying, mobilizing, evaluating, predicting, and otherwise managing different aspects of life of individuals within its domain.

The population within the territorial boundary of the modern state therefore becomes something to be regulated. Acting on the population is effective when individuals are properly spatially organized and all aspects of their individual life are routinely documented. As Weber (1964) observed, a methodical and orderly accumulation of information requires a trained cadre of professionals with formal qualifications to perform specifically assigned tasks according to legal rules, hierarchy of responsibilities, and decision making that depends on the mastering of the information gathered. Some suggest that this type of governmentality was developed to make the states more productive for the needs of emerging capitalist enterprise and for industrialization more generally, whereas others explain biopolitics and its bureaucracy as a means of state control in relation to the European imperialist enterprise (see Higgs, 2001).

These objectives became possible through a series of processes that heighten the relation of acquisition and articulation of knowledge to governing of the modern state through the state’s sovereign right over a bounded territory and the people who reside within. This form of governmentality was able to come to the forefront through two related developments. A particular kind of cosmology was gradually emerging in pre-modern Europe that broke the universe upheld by the Roman Catholic
Church into categories of the polity, the economy, and religion (Dumont, 1977). Through this process, the individual became established as the central social category. This modern cosmology opened the way to the development of a system of classification of the world that has its own epistemology and logic through which control and change are exerted on the world. Surveillance, its technologies, and its practices have roots in these transformations and are the outgrowth of this new system of classification.

The Cosmology of Modernity

Dividing the world into categories is a part of social life, and classification is integral to any kind of social organization (Bowker & Star, 1999). We classify living and nonliving things in our surroundings to make sense of the world and our life within. Categories are, therefore, not what we think about. They are how we come to see the world the way we do. They work as underlying ordering processes that organize our acting on the world and our making sense of it. To logicians, as Douglas and Hull (1992) emphasize, categories are “extralogical” because one cannot escape the categories within which one thinks. To statisticians, categories are cognitive constructs that allow aggregating specific kinds of information for the purposes of modeling, acting, projecting, and decision making (Desrosières, 1998). To early sociologists, classifications are aspects of social and symbolic life through which people make sense of the world and themselves (Durkheim & Mauss, 1963). Classification, however conceived, plays a role in how we relate to each other and informs our moral and social order. No less, classification orders the world we live in and shapes how we act on it. In its broadest sense, categories form our cosmology, our understanding of how the world works and how different elements in the world relate to each other and to us. The individualistic cosmological world we now inhabit is so pervasive that we take it for granted. Its worldwide spread makes reflection difficult. Now that almost every inch of the globe has been parcelled into states (however contested those state boundaries may be) and most people rendered denizens of one state or another (or strive to be), other kinds of social order almost seem unimaginable. Yet it is precisely the origin of this governmentality that needs to be understood if we are to make sense of surveillance.

The classification of the world that comes to the forefront in modernity follows a cosmological order different from any other that existed before in Europe. The state stands as a separate category from the church. The individual is wholly formed as a central social unit, separate and distinct from the kinship group. Louis Dumont presents us with persuasive analysis of how the constitution of these categories emerged through the process of separation, first of the polity from religion (Dumont, 1982) and then of economics from the polity (Dumont, 1977). He traces the origins of this transformation to the early Christian teachings that introduce a new relationship to God. In this new tradition, connection with the deity is not established within the
kinship group and through collective communal processes but rather through each individual’s personal relation to God. Although other religions also show conceptions of individuality, Christianity provides the foundation for individualism to emerge as a central ideology (Dumont, 1986). The articulation of the individual as a central social and moral unit emerges gradually throughout the centuries. Its most intensive expression becomes articulated throughout the periods of the Renaissance, Protestantism, and the Enlightenment, when the Church gradually loses its cosmological hegemony. The cosmology of the harmony of the universal holism articulated through the authority of the Roman Catholic Church gave way to a new cosmology that sees the category of the state as the domain of the political, the category of exchange as the domain of economics, and the category of the individual as a self-sufficient social unit.

In this new cosmology, which reached its peak in the American Revolution and then in the French Revolution, the state and the economy work for the good and the benefit of the individual. The individual now stands independent and self-contained in relation to them. This means the breakdown of the holistic cosmos that unified, conceptually, the relationship between life on earth and life in the afterworld and, practically, the relations between all living and nonliving things and the divine power of God, whose will is being fulfilled on earth. In its place come the categories of the state, the economy, religion, and the family. Once in place, each of these categories develops its own autonomy according to its own internal organization and regulation: the state through its own political institutions, the economy through private property and the notion of individual wealth, the church through its subsequent splitting into denominations and sects, and the nuclear family as separate from the extended kinship system.

As Dumont’s (1977, 1982) seminal contributions to the study of Western individualism suggest, through this process of centuries-long transformation, the individual emerges as the central unit of social organization, a value in and of itself. This individual now exercises free choice in binding with another individual to form a family, enters the economic process through the rights to private property and exchange of goods, claims membership in a particular Christian denomination, and becomes a citizen of the state. The cosmology of the European individual now consists of different categories, each integrating the individual into its own domain in different ways and according to its own laws and specifications: the state into a nation, the economy into what is now global exchange, the religion into a membership of devotion, the family into a familial union. In this multiplicity of relations, the individual remains a self-sufficient, rational actor who chooses to take part in these categories to the best of his or her interests. Yet none of these categories can fully integrate the individual into a cosmological whole.

This cosmology, now fractured into the private and the various domains of the public, with the individual standing as its central, independent, social unit, provides the grounds for several other historical processes that enabled the emergence of surveillance. The larger classifications can now be split into potentially limitless
numbers of ever smaller categories. The individuals can now be classified, reclassified, and normalized within any of these categories. This becomes possible through the conception of bureaucratic classification and its own logic of operation. Bureaucratic classification and its epistemology enable biopolitics as a form of governmentality. To understand the current imperative of security and its surveillance practices, it is necessary to think about the nature of this classification and how its logic of acting on things and people becomes an ordering principle for exerting change on the world.

**Bureaucratic Classification**

As Bowker and Star (1999) have suggested, whichever way classifications are formed, however they are conceived, and whatever their nature or durability may be, classifications are frameworks that order thought and action. Following the fragmentation of the holistic Christian cosmos, there emerged in Europe a type of bureaucratic classification which is divorced from the divine. As archaeologists and historians have demonstrated, bureaucracies existed as far back as ancient Mesopotamia (Frankfort, 1948). These classificatory systems, however, connected the order of human and natural existence to the supernatural order. What eventually emerges in Europe is a bureaucracy independent from theism. This enables the emergence of the process of acquisition of knowledge through unimpeded creation of classifications for whatever purposes. Classifications now become invented by specially trained professionals whose knowledge endows them with legitimacy and authority. They are created by government officials to support their descriptions of different aspects of the population they govern so that tools can be devised and policies and recommendations articulated for the purposes of state administration (Desrosières, 1998). They are envisioned by scientists driven by the goal of knowing the world by dividing the complex interconnections between natural and human life into an ordered grid of ever more detailed categories through which life can be explained (Foucault, 1973). They are constructed by technocrats to help them simulate virtual spaces of human action to imagine and preprogram courses of counteraction to be activated as needed (Bogard, 1996). To understand how control can be exercised through surveillance practices and procedures, we need to pay attention to how such classifications are created and how they deal with information.

Professionals create bureaucratic classifications to form and order the social world to manage its transformations. In whatever ways aspects of the world are divided, each separate part or segment can be made into or placed into a discrete category that gives it identity and definition. Foucault (1973, pp. 50-58) located the origins of this kind of rationality in the shift from knowing the world by drawing relations between phenomena and objects toward acquiring knowledge by dividing the observable into ordered successions of elements. To know the world on the basis of similarities means seeing resemblances of the microcosm of the every day life in
the macrocosm of the world and the planets. The complex webs of connections between living and nonliving things have a purpose of their own which is beyond human control, so that to know the world is to strive to understand this complexity of the whole. The manner in which the world can be known through the principle of discrimination is one of identifying elements that are distinct representations of a particular phenomenon and then seeking to locate these elements within the order of successive categories already established. For Foucault, understanding through this kind of reasoning means that every living being has distinct properties, that these properties can be identified, and that it must inevitably be possible to arrange these properties into a series in which each unit is related to the one that precedes it and the one that comes after.

This kind of reasoning was akin to biopolitics, in which classifying individuals necessarily means separating the individual self from the elements that form its living being. As Desrosières (1998) suggests, human beings as such cannot be of much use to the state and its needs unless their dates of birth and death, number of children, profession, gender, religious affiliation, or real estate ownership can be documented and evaluated. Only then can insurance premiums be estimated, soldiers conscripted, and taxes levied. Bureaucratic classification works on the principle of separation of information about an individual from that actual human being. Once separated, the information is defined and formatted into data. That data can then be compiled within a category, to be ready for analysis. This process makes individuals invisible and renders only information about them relevant. Yet it is on the basis of this information that the lives of individuals are governed and mobilized by the state.

What counts as information or what makes for useful data is driven by the need to know the world in ever smaller detail, the need to explain every conceivable phenomenon. Knowledge about existing phenomena and their taxonomies creates the need for information. So, too, every time a new taxonomy is brought into existence, it creates a new space for the acquisition of knowledge in that it exposes the need for specified knowledge about this class of phenomena. Each category opens a new space in the social world about which knowledge can be acquired in ever more specialized domains. Each can potentially give rise to a new cadre of specialists who, as Foucault (1980a) remarked, claim the power of truth in this domain. This makes it possible to envision governmentality of populations whose behavior can now be explained on the basis of information available, categorized in relation to other classifications, and projected on the basis of available knowledge (see Chalfin, 2007). Knowledgeable professionals and their ability to continuously classify the world into ever more specialized units becomes a part of the state’s power to govern. Once created, information is accumulated within their rubric, knowledge is acquired about whatever phenomena they subsume, and procedures are devised to act on these phenomena.
Bureaucratic Logic

As Don Handelman (2004) has demonstrated, this capacity to classify and reclassify at will gives bureaucratic classification its own logic and inertia. This logic not only drives the classificatory activity but also allows it to act on the social world. In his terms, bureaucratic logic is processual in its way of operation, causal in its activity, and linear in the direction to which it exerts change on the world. The Weberian legal–rational decision making, offices, specializations, rules and regulations, efficiency, and spheres of authority comprise the structure of bureaucracy. Underlying, supporting, and enabling this structure is the processual logic with which it operates. Handelman has shown how this ability to initiate social change through continuous reinvention and reclassification of taxonomic categories comes to form a system that is self-regulating and self-organizing. Once taxonomies are formed, bureaucracy is able to do the work through these categories, no longer dealing with individuals as persons but only with information extracted from them.

Through this ability to create new taxonomies by endlessly splitting larger categories and inventing new taxonomies, Handelman (2004) suggests, the system deals with ambiguity and fuzziness. For any possible phenomenon, information can be found that identifies it, and this information can always be classified. Given that bureaucratic classification divides the world into categories to make it knowable and manageable, specific information is able to be positioned into exclusive categories so that a particular datum can be placed into only one category. When the incoming information does not fit into the existing categories, this ambiguity can be solved simply by inventing a new category. With it, new procedures can be devised for how this category is to be implemented. In this way, all possible information about the social world can be subsumed by this classification system into ever more specialized categories. In principle, this form of classification has the ability to continuously absorb and process all possible information and the ability to accumulate information within each category. At the same time, information within any category can be reclassified for whatever purpose.

It is through this logic that it was possible to conceive of the DNA sequence, fingerprint, and retina scan as data to be classified into categories such as terrorist, no-fly list, watch list, or no-entry list. The information on these lists is cross-referenced with other lists, and through this process, new lists are formed—losing contact and reference to the individuals themselves and operating only with the information about them yet able to profoundly affect the lives of individuals to whom this information is assigned. So too, through this same bureaucratic logic, individuals and objects are classified as safe or dangerous, and taxonomies of situations of security and threat are created—all without the challenge of ambiguity (Bajc, 2007; Broeders & Engbersen, 2007; Chalfin, 2007).

As Foucault (1977/1979) emphasized, biopolitics is fully successful when subjects come to govern themselves according to state specifications. These specifications
were to be found not only in law books and police manuals but also in the organization of social space. He described a prototype of this governmentality through self-discipline using an architectural design invented by Jeremy Bentham as a new prison design. Built as a circular structure of contiguous individual units with a watch tower in the middle, this panopticon was designed to expose those encircled within to the perpetual gaze of whoever was watching from the tower. At the same time, the tower was hiding the watchers from the sight of the inmates. The logic of this organization of inmates’ movement in space, as they are positioned within their individual cells through time, as their every move is exposed to the gaze of the watcher, is able to exert control over people’s behavior through invisibility. Those who are watching are invisible to the inmates, who never know when they are being watched or by whom. As a result, the inmates regulate their own behavior and discipline themselves according to what they understand are the watchers’ expectations of normality. At the same time, the inmates themselves have been made invisible as individuals to those who watch them so that surveillance by the operatives can be reduced to a routine.

The notion of governmentality implies that there is a particular rationale—or mentality—to this governing. When this rationale becomes internalized by individuals, they become fully governable subjects. What they are to internalize is aided by judgments about what is ordinary and what is not acceptable, or what is secure and what can be potentially dangerous. Foucault (2003) observed that these judgments have roots in the notion of an abnormal individual whose difference from the norm was articulated in relation to specifications of normalities and pathologies by specialized bodies of knowledge. On the basis of such specialized knowledge, control came to be legitimately exerted over individuals. The more improved the knowledge about individuals, the greater the possibility to discipline them and fit them within the specificities of the normal (Foucault, 1980a). From this kind of confidence that the knowledgeable put in their own production of truth and the power they were able to exert on the world, Foucault (1977/1979) was able to conclude that accumulation of different regimes of knowledge concerning normality and abnormality helped give birth to the notion that human behavior outside the specificities of the normal could be disciplined into the norms of acceptable. As contributors to this issue demonstrate (Bajc; Chalfin; Nieuwenhuys & Pécloud) and as I discuss below, this bureaucratic epistemology has pushed Foucault’s model of panoptic surveillance into a wide variety of public domains.

**Governmentality of Potentialities**

Ordering human life on the basis of obtaining, classifying, and processing information about human behavior is the foundation of the official social organization of the modern states. The polity, the economy, and the smooth functioning of much of daily life depend on professionals who claim particular expertise, accumulation
of specialized bodies of knowledge, and continuous development of technologies to process this information. The accumulation of data and the invention of statistical models not only facilitate management of everyday life, but they also enable the state to envision future human behavior. Formulating procedures and methods for a course of future activity means thinking out acts beforehand and envisioning how they are to evolve. State budgets, corporate planning, sales projections, war strategizing, battle simulations, and insurance premiums are all based on the principles of working with available information to be able to project the future. All are highly specialized domains of expertise without which the economy, the state, or the military could not effectively work. Biopolitics means governmentality of the present as much as management of human behavior that is yet to happen.

What enables this directionality is the capacity to easily deal with the ambiguity and complexity of human life by simply treating human behavior as information to be classified and reclassified according to any new situation. This ability to bring to life new categories and procedures to deal with any new information about human behavior makes it possible for the bureaucracy to absorb and sort endless amounts of information without crisis. Through this logic, the system is never seriously forced to confront the challenges of ambiguity or volume of information. We see that the system has been able to absorb previously unimaginable amounts of data brought about by the development of digital technologies that have greatly accelerated the flow of information and its accumulation, codification, and processing. The information now flowing through the digital channels has enabled an automatic channeling of data into databases. Technological innovations in computer systems continue to produce storage devices with huge memory capabilities and processing speed. Although this system and its logic of operation make it possible to continue to subsume and process new information, technological innovations in communications systems facilitate this process with increasing speed.

In the context of surveillance, the notion of speed in relation to information has important implications. Gathering, absorbing, and processing new information through digitized technology now enables compilation of data in real time. The invention of digitized data not only enables automatic acquisition of all information that flows through communication channels, but it also opens up possibilities of limitless data storage and automatic tracing of individual behavior throughout anyone’s lifetime and across the globe. Human behavior can now not only be managed in space within the state’s territory, but it can also be followed in real time and beyond the state boundary. As soon as a new classification is brought to existence, movement of each specific individual can be traced day by day, hour by hour, from continent to continent, from state to state—as particular bureaucratic specifications and procedures require. Through this process in real time and through global space, biopolitics takes on a new dimension. For a state, it is now not only possible to plan and control the course of the future within its territory. It now becomes possible to conceive of strategies that would preempt future events at any time and any place.
This enables the governmentality of potentialities. Surveillance provides a steady flow of information that can be continuously followed in time so that when the specifications of a particular classification suggest that an undesirable potentiality is appearing on the horizon, the governance experts can be ready to preempt an unwanted future activity from materializing. Governmentality of potentialities means the urge to act in the face of the unexpected and at the moment when it appears. This urge has come to be articulated within the category of security.

The speed with which information is collected, the ease of invention of new categories, the ability to follow accumulation of information in real time and through space, and the tendency to act on the spot in the face of the abnormal are exerting pressure on the bureaucratic structure of this system. State surveillance is limited to the boundary of the state and structured through laws and regulations, hierarchy of authority, and complex decision making. The urge to preempt the future is pushing through the rigidity of this structure in search of flexibility to adjust to newly emerging potentialities through swift decision making and acting on the spot. With security as the dominant ordering principle, the practice of surveillance is changing the relationship between the individual and the state, our notions of private and public, and our moral order.

Securitization

In thinking about how security as the new dominant ordering principle directs surveillance practices, I have made use of Ole Waever’s (1995) articulation of securitization. In his terms, securitization means attempts to broaden the notion of security beyond its original meaning of state defense and include in this domain social, environmental, and political issues. Securitization as a discourse surfaced in the 1980s with multiple political agendas that sought to broaden the security policies to include not only security of the state but also security of the people and their environment. Security specialists, theorists, and other actors argued that economic welfare, multiplicity of cultural identities, demographic shifts, environmental concerns, resources, health care and disease, human rights, and other issues related to human needs were as much a threat to security as a military conflict. For some, these were efforts to redirect distribution of resources designated for military purposes to other concerns. For others, it was a way to express their discontent with European integration and relate migration issues to threats to national and cultural identity.

Waever (1995) notes that securitization, or rendering an issue a security problem, is a sure way to achieve social and political mobilization and a sense of urgency to set priorities through unprecedented responses. When a phenomenon is securitized, however, the response takes shape in relation to threat, defense, and state-centered solutions rather than solving the problem at hand. This is so because security as a practice exists only in relation to the state. Security as a word does have an everyday usage in relation to safety, but its meaning has no implied activity. There is, Waever
wrote, no philosophical thought, no literary tradition, and no tradition of practice of security outside the domain of the state. Security is therefore an agenda, articulated by experts, agencies, and officials through a set of practices, traditions, and policies in relation to specific conditions. Historically, the term *security* has referred to the ability of the state, that is, an autonomous, territorially organized political entity, to take a position against competing interests of other states in the realm of global interstate relations. This notion of security is founded on the premise that stability and survival of the state can be threatened by activities of other states. When such developments are identified as a security threat, the state claims the special right to act and takes the attitude that intervention may be necessary. For this reason, securitization is likely to have a state-centered response.

The establishment, previously opposed to securitization, began to embrace it following the end of the cold war. Waever (1995) has argued that the concept offered a possible rearticulation of the national security policies rendered irrelevant after the binary world order was dissolved. The genealogy of securitization is an urgent concern that requires its own treatment, which cannot be done in this context. What is relevant for this discussion is how securitization as discussed above establishes the individual as the central point in relation to which issues of security should be assessed and security policies established. This perspective makes it possible to see how security, as the power and the right of the state to act and intervene in the face of threats to its sovereignty, can enter the public sphere as the right and the responsibility of the state to act in the face of threat to personal and communal safety. Security, still articulated by a cadre of professionals associated with state power, becomes articulated as the question of individual well-being, integrity of the state, and sustainability of the environment but practiced in the tradition of state defense. In this sense, the state affirms its role of protecting individuals while the individuals remain responsible for their own insecurities.

The new taxonomy encompasses safety of the individual body, individual psychological well-being, protection of individual property and public resources, communal safety, national integrity, sovereignty of the state, and state of the environment. Through the established field of state defense, or what Waever (1995, p. 48) calls “an ongoing debate, a tradition, an established set of practices,” securitization is a cognitive and a discursive meta-form that subordinates the individual, the communal, and the societal to the established set of practices of the state agencies of coercion and their binary logic of war (Bajc, 2007). It becomes a meta-frame against which everything is judged in relation to which everything takes form. It is global and individual at the same time. It is a notion that unites individuated people into a collective position under the wing of the state. As Beck (1992) has suggested, there is a collective expectation that something must be done about the prospect of unwanted events in the future and that probabilities and potentialities of what is to come must be assessed and acted on. Within the meta-frame of security, combining the perspective of the individual and the ways of the state, a threat now potentially
means any individual within and without the state territory, citizen and noncitizen, documented and undocumented. Bureaucratic identification for the purpose of surveillance now takes a new turn.

The Outsider

From the perspective of securitization discussed above, future activity must have actors with intentionality. Such is the nature of state defense policies. With security now in the realm of the social, intentionality is to be sought among each and every one of us. These actors are therefore no longer articulated on the basis of state affiliation but rather as a collective Outsider. Securitization turns the notion of the abnormal in Foucauldian terms into that of Outsider. This is potentially anyone inside or outside the state borders, whether citizen, undocumented migrant worker, tourist, terrorist, refugee, asylum seeker, or any other mobile individual. Like the Foucauldian abnormal, the Outsider is designated as such on the basis of specialized knowledge provided by surveillance professionals who analyze information to assess the individual’s intentionality. But although the abnormal, as Foucault (1977/1979) discussed, is put within the regimes of correction until he or she can be said to be fit to return, the fate of the Outsider is very different. As contributions to this volume demonstrate, the Outsider is expelled from within, as is the case with undocumented migrants (Broeders & Engbersen); prevented from entering, as we see at seaports (Chalfin); or otherwise excluded through mass-mediated communication (Nieuwenhuys & Pécoud; Bajc).

For the surveillance apparatus to envision the intention of future activity, the Outsider is articulated as an ideal type, an agent capable of causing mass destruction of natural, human, and cultural resources. Envisioning the future of this ideal type Outsider requires imagining estimated future intentionality. From the perspective of the professionals and their official agencies where such classifications and typologies are created, the Outsider lacks territorial boundaries, traditional institutional infrastructure, clearly defined identity, predictable tactics, and comprehensible capabilities. These are elements of a classical state defense institution which would, under the classical context of interstate relations, allow another state to form a plausible counterdefense policy. These professionals contend that the Outsider is organized but that its organizational structure does not follow a top-down model of bureaucratic organizations that are based on a hierarchical chain of command and clearly defined roles, as is the case, for example, with the conventional military, where the top military officials answer to the head of state. From the perspective of the surveillance apparatus, the ability to preempt the intentionality of the Outsider requires flexibility to act.

Some scholars have offered a vision of what such a new approach to preemptive action might entail. To think of these actors of potentialities in organizational terms, Karin Knorr Cetina (2005) has suggested, is to see their interconnectedness as what
she calls *global microstructures*, locally formulated groups of individuals that are globally connected through loosely coupled networks. In these terms, Handelman (forthcoming) has suggested that this organizational form may resemble what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) referred to as the rhizome, a system of connections that operate on the surface rather than in depth and through “variation, expansion, conquest . . . always detachable, connectable, [and] reversible . . . with multiple entryways and exits” (p. 21). Following Handelman (forthcoming), this rhizome is a debureaucratized social form. It is freed from institutionally assigned roles and their responsibilities to a hierarchical ziggurat of leadership. This detachment, looseness, and decentralization make it possible to experiment through trial and error, sometimes executing the goal of the act of destruction successfully, other times failing to do so. Its capillaries spring to life for a specific period at an unpredictable location, exist on the principle of self-organization to carry out a self-chosen mission, and disappear after the fact to possibly reemerge at some other place and time for a different purpose.

From the perspective of governmentality of potentialities and its urge to preempt such intentionality, flexibility means freedom from legal constraints to create categories of danger and the specifications for acting on it in any given situation. Contributions to this volume discuss how the push for such flexibility manifests itself at seaports (Chalfin), in policing (de Lint et al.), in dealing with undocumented migration (Broeders & Engbersen), and during public events (Bajc). Because the Outsider is potentially anyone, to be useful, this general classification must have subcategories of danger, such as different levels, degrees, and kinds. This leads surveillance experts to look for more specific and more detailed information that would allow them to distinguish those Outsiders whose intentionality of destruction appears imminent from all others. This also allows for devising specifications for how to follow these agents through time and space.

**The Private**

Governmentality oriented toward preempting future events from materializing seeks the kind of information about individuals that can be followed in real time and, as it is followed, provide clues to the surveillance experts when it is time to act. For this, it is not enough that all individuals simply be properly documented. They must also be documented in such a way that each human body becomes inseparable from information about that body and identity assigned to it. Although human beings embody multiple identities that are always in flux, shifting and changing as one’s life circumstances change, biopolitics of the modern state invented bureaucratic identities that are fixed. Often this is a number, assigned to individuals inside the state territory for the purposes of state regulation and management. Such a number is either assigned to the individual at birth or after naturalization to the state. It is either a random or a sequential number, based on the numerical system of the registry that often also encodes place and date of birth and policies of local residential governance.
These numbers are attached to the human body, and therefore they can just as easily be detached and assigned to someone else. As Broeders and Engbersen discuss, from the standpoint of the undocumented migrants, bureaucratic identity is something to be appropriated and used for the benefit of their own particular circumstances.

To avoid such ambiguities of bureaucratic identity, surveillance experts, now operating within the meta-frame of securitization and its governmentality of potentialities, seek more detailed information, improved technologies, and novel techniques to create ever more specialized taxonomies within the classification of Outsider. This logic leads to seeking ever more detailed information, going beyond the registry number assigned to a person and penetrating the individual body, looking for ever more uniquely distinguishable marks. It also leads to perfecting technologies that are thought to reliably extract such information from the body. Information about the individual, the name, the address, date and place of birth, and a facial photo are no longer considered detailed enough. The apparatus now maintains that more detailed, more personal information is needed for bureaucratic identification, that is, information that cannot be separated from that body. This means a shift from assigning a bureaucratic identity to the body to extracting bodily marks from the body itself, such as prints from fingers, sequence of the DNA from bodily tissue, or retina design from one’s eye. This information, said to mark the body as distinct from all others and therefore nontransferable, is referred to as biometrics.

To the apparatus, biometrics is the most reliable information that can be coded into a fixed bureaucratic identity of an individual. This allows for other information pertaining to that individual to be attached to this code. Such information is accumulated through electronic means into different commercial databases. Each database separately compiles information that reveals how we live our daily life: credit card companies, register purchases; telephone companies, every phone call; the Internet providers, every Internet activity; banks, monetary transactions; border police, state border crossings. Each database encodes different aspects of our individuality: our preferences, tastes, friendships, family ties, and wealth. The state, as Agamben (1998) has demonstrated, retains the sovereign power to access this information as needed and act accordingly. A simple cross-referencing of these databases makes it possible to compile such information into a single individual file.

This accumulation of information across space and time allows the experts to encode the past activity and the present activity into a trajectory that can now be classified into subclasses of degrees of danger or threat. When linked to multiple centralized databases, these classifications and the information within them can be cross-referenced across numbers of individuals so that new categories of activities and patterns of human behavior can be created about subclasses of phenomena. For each, specifications can be devised about what such taxonomy is likely to yield in the future, how to envision this future as a real possibility, and how to preempt it. The techno-logic of information gathering and processing is not only the speed with which it is accumulated but also the accuracy of detail, the perfection of irreversibility of bodily
markers, and the totalizing scope it strives to achieve. Its use is in the way it allows the experts to follow this information and continuously reclassify its content so that it becomes possible to envision what specific individuals within a particular category are likely to do in the future and, at a particular time, make the decision to preempt the fruition of that activity.

The Public

We observe in the public domain a process, complementary to the parceling out of the individual into ever more detailed classifications. There is a tendency to exert control over mobility in public spaces by parceling out the state territory into various types of enclosures. The splitting of individual into smaller categories allows for accumulation of up-to-date information and positioning of this information into categories with particular specifications. Spatial enclosures are social spaces into which only those types of individuals or goods are admitted that fit particular kinds of specifications. These are, therefore, enclosures of exclusivity. They are encircled by a physical boundary to keep whatever is inside separated from that which remains outside. Within these enclosures, different types of sovereignty are put into place for different purposes. Gated communities are residential zones of private exclusivity and privilege. Detention centers are secret zones of exclusion that allow the surveillance apparatus to bypass the legal restrictions in their dealing with individuals classified as security threats (Broeders & Engbersen, 2007). Airports and seaports are zones of complex operations of flows of people and goods where securitization meets market forces and their push for efficiency (Chalfin, 2007). Though these zones of sovereignty are relatively permanent, other zones are brought to existence for very specific purposes only to be dismantled after the fact (Bajc, 2007). Once the zones of sovereignty are put in place, their boundaries as well as their interior spaces are handed over to corporations that offer the latest surveillance technology and services of trained surveillance professionals.

Entryways into such enclosures are referred to as security checkpoints. These are physical locations that block the flow routes of people and objects for the purposes of inspection, followed by admission, into various zones of sovereignty on the basis of information about them. The checkpoint has become the single, most ubiquitous manifestation of securitization and the spatial embodiment of the governmentality of potentialities. As the contributions to this volume demonstrate, the checkpoint can be installed or dismantled at any time as the specifications of a given classification demand (Bajc), it can efficiently process large numbers of objects (Chalfin), or exert control over mobility of large numbers of people without any concern for how this process may effect people's goals (Bajc). Through these practices, the checkpoint becomes a manifestation of the state's push for flexibility to act on the future, its ability to deal with ambiguity and scale, and its power to identify and remove Outsiders from everyone else. The checkpoint is an architectural design that reflects the ordering logic
of bureaucratic classification and its epistemology of knowing the world by positioning information into ever more specialized units. As Bajc (2007) describes, this is where the private individual is cut open and displayed in its parts in public so that the security operatives may assess specific information about these parts in order to determine whether the individual is to be included or excluded. The checkpoint symbolizes simultaneously the parceling out of the individual into ever smaller units as well as the totalizing scope of securitization. No less, these are physical locales where the state's intimate relationship with the corporate sector is displayed in full force by featuring the latest achievements in surveillance technology and techniques.

At these checkpoints, discipline as the power to normalize individuals according to state specifications takes on a new meaning. The process of passing through the airport security check can illustrate this point. Who may or may not enter the airport zone is determined through the process of inspection. The individuals line up, one after the other, politely respectful of each other's personal space. At the front of the line, an individual's personal space is being dissected by the machine and its operatives. The body is stripped of all accessories, to be passed through the metal detector, the belongings neatly arranged on the conveyer belt to be scanned by the machine and inspected by the operatives—one at a time. Every so often, a body is chosen for special attention and asked to step aside to let the machine and the operative inspect the body in still more detail. The people wait patiently, each already aware of what is expected when one approaches the conveyer belt and each also aware that they all have the same instrumental goal—boarding the plane safely and on time. To this end, this inspection must produce information. This information must be classified by the surveillance operatives into one of the two possible categories, the insider or the outsider. The more detailed, complete, and unambiguous information provided by the individuals who pass through this checkpoint, the more efficient this process of classification is likely to be. Behavior outside of these specifications of normality leads to ambiguity and fuzziness, potentially causing disruption for everyone involved to their instrumental goal. At these types of checkpoints, the state's totalizing power to control through surveillance meets the public realization that securitization as the principle of ordering of social life cannot be possible without self-discipline.

The public domain is where we, the public, are able to see and experience how taxonomies and their specifications produced within the meta-frame of securitization are used to order our social life. Mass media provide a crucial link through which the general public is made aware of, and informed about, different practices of surveillance in service of securitization. As de Lint and his colleagues discuss in this issue, the mass media are a venue through which state agencies seek public legitimacy for their surveillance operations. For example, we are informed in great detail how the operatives unraveled a terrorist plot: how they received tips about abnormal behavior of particular individuals; how they were able to follow conversations, travels, purchases, and internet searches of these individuals; how this information allowed the operatives to conclude that these individuals were plotting terrorist activities; and how, at just the right
moment, the operatives were able to preempt the intended acts of mass destruction. So, too, as Bajc demonstrates in this issue, the media are an indispensable element of security meta-rituals that order public events. In this case, the media communicate to the public the details of spatial and temporal ordering through which the zone of safety is brought to existence: which streets will be closed off and when, where the checkpoints will be installed, what the public is allowed to carry through the checkpoints, and what kind of surveillance resources and technologies are employed to create and maintain an impermeable boundary between the zone of safety and the everyday life. In this process of acquiring ever more detailed information and grouping individuals within different zones of exclusion, the mass media also constitute a virtual world in which the citizenry feels connected. They provide a public sphere in the Habermasian sense where the citizenry follows the court battles over illegal aspects of surveillance and where the citizenry could debate how much security should be given up in exchange for freedom. In this sense, the Habermasian public sphere is very often not a forum of public deliberation over how the matters of civic life will be handled, but rather, a sphere where the public and its institutions of law debate the outcomes and the consequences of the state's preemptive actions.

The Corporate Security State

Under the category of securitization and its specifications, the state has been undergoing multiple shifts. What was before the governmentality of management and planning of population behavior within the territorial boundaries is now stretching across the boundary of the state and is concerned with potentialities that appear imminent. This leads to a change in the citizen–state relationship. Since securitization presupposes that any human being within and outside the state can potentially be a threat to security, the governable subjects are no longer assumed to be citizens with automatic rights which the state must respect. This concern with potentialities assumes that anyone can become the enemy of the state at any time and this requires up-to-date information about individuals. From the perspective of the state, global labor and leisure migration, increasing numbers of undocumented migrants, and increasing disparities in the global distribution of wealth only multiply potentialities for threats and strengthen the state's need for surveillance in real time. The working of the checkpoint perhaps most clearly embodies this change and symbolizes how the state now sees its relationship to its citizens. At the same checkpoint, inspection is done over and over again to the same citizen each time this citizen seeks to pass through. So, too, the same person who wishes to enter zones of sovereignty of different specifications is made to pass all the different checkpoints. To make certain that a person is not a threat to the state, the information must always be up-to-date and assessed in real time so that each time a citizen leaves a zone of sovereignty and wishes to return, he or she must pass the inspection and be admitted anew (see Bajc, 2007).
Through these shifts, the state as a form of social organization has proven to be remarkably flexible. It has been able to reshape itself to encompass, subsume, and capture populations within its domain. So, too, it has been able to expel from within itself mobility that is in excess or not assimilable. In doing so, as Agamben (2005) has pointed out, the state has been able to work within the legal limits as well as evade the legal constraints. In the governmentality of potentialities, oriented within the meta-frame of securitization, ordering continues to follow the bureaucratic logic developed through biopolitics at the inception of the modern state but expands and reshapes its Weberian bureaucratic structure. Internally, this means organizing surveillance agencies in such a way that the officials within each agency must orient their responsibilities to the meta-frame of securitization (de Lint et al., 2007). This system allows the decision-making specifications to be more centralized. Externally, this means forging suprastate security alliances to be able to surpass the limitations of state-bound surveillance (Chalfin, 2007). At both levels, the state seeks to outsource its responsibilities to private enterprise. In the state’s push for flexibility, outsourcing and privatization of surveillance services seem to be a way to bypass and work around the rigidity of its own Weberian bureaucratic structure of legal rules and hierarchy of responsibilities. Kapferer (2005) suggests that we are seeing the emergence of a new state form which combines state bureaucracy with corporate formations at a global scale. In his terms, this emerging state form is less concerned with Hobbesian responsibilities to its citizens and oriented more toward expansion of commerce, deregulation, and freedom from public participation.

It remains to be studied in more detail which parts of this corporate security state remain bureaucratized, to what extent, and for what purposes. As discussed in this issue, we see through Bajc’s case study of surveillance surrounding a public event that being a part of state bureaucracy ensures funding from the state budget and provides the surveillance policies with the legitimacy needed in a democratic political system. We have also been observing that within the state bureaucracy, its professionals seek to redefine the legislation that binds the workings of the institution to constitutional law and public transparency (for example, Yoo, 2005). On the other hand, the extension of the apparatus into the domain of private enterprise ensures a continuous supply of technological innovation in surveillance and allows for outsourcing of the executive part of its policies. Suprastate alliances are forged not only for the purposes of sharing surveillance data and technologies but also to provide local supply of surveillance labor and entrepreneurial services in different territories around the world. This coupling of state bureaucracies with private companies allows the surveillance infrastructure to work more like a rhizome, chasing, tracing, and confronting its terrorist Other worldwide, appearing where the enemy cell springs up or is expected to emerge, executing the job (sometimes more and other times less successfully), and being ready for the next assignment—wherever that may be.
Concluding Remarks

Hannah Arendt (1951) was among the early observers who suggested that parliamentary democracy as a choice of political organization of the modern state, and totalitarianism as its opposite, are in effect very closely related. They dance along the same edge, sliding now on the side of democracy, then into the realm of totalitarianism. Very recent history records colonial repression, the Holocaust, and the destruction of civilians and property rather than armies in the two world wars. The present offers more genocide, more occupation, spectacular terrorist activity, and ever improving techniques of population control—this time on a truly global level and at a scope never before conceived. Through this process, biopolitics as a form of governmentality and bureaucratic infrastructure as a means of acting on the world continue to enable the state to mold itself to new circumstances by simply redesigning bureaucratic categories along the way. Securitization is, from this perspective, simply another classificatory schema, a bureaucratic taxonomy that embodies within itself a set of responses, already internal to it, that will be followed by the cadre of professionals who claim legitimacy based on their specialized knowledge. It may be too early to speculate how stable and enduring this taxonomy of securitization will be. The answer to this question will come from localized observations of how this meta-frame is put to work to exert social change in particular contexts and how these different applications reflect the specifications of this taxonomy and its taxonomic mutations through time.

As such, governmentality of potentialities opens up multiple multidirectional spaces of interaction of information and activity. It connects the domain of the state with that of the corporate, complementing legitimacy and relative stability of statist institutions with flexibility, freedom from legal constraints, and marketplace innovation. It spans its activity from the local to the global, connecting the communal policing and secret service activity with war and warlike operations worldwide. It brings the personal to the domain of the public, freeing sources of information from the protective shield of the private to make them available for data mining and reclassification at a global scope. If, as Handelman has suggested, the rhizomatic form that structures the initiatives of the Outsider and the preemptive activity of the security apparatus are self-organizing systems, then their properties are fractured, uncertain, and emergent where cause and effect stand in disproportionate relationship to one another. Following Urry’s (2003) understanding of complexity, microevents of such a system are intersecting with multiple spaces of social activity that can emerge as effects of unforeseeable macroproportions. So, too, a system’s macroevents themselves operate at multiple intersecting trajectories of microsocial spaces.

The meta-form of the taxonomy of securitization, however transitory or permanent it turns out to be, subjects biopolitics to the dynamics of the market played simultaneously at the level of the personal, the local, and the global. The forces of
governmentality now flow freely within another multidirectional space, this one opening up the personal to the domains of the global. The dissolution of the protective space of the private opens up a different set of issues. Following Dumont (1977, 1982), cosmological transformations that became articulated throughout the Enlightenment and have taken full form in modernity have brought to the forefront and made central a new social unit, previously very marginal in other human forms of social organization, that of the individual. The coming to existence of this new social unit was accompanied by another transformation, namely, the moral and ethical articulation of what the individual is. Modernity placed a paramount value in the individual as an autonomous, independent, unique self, entitled to privacy, personal possessions, and legal protection by the state. Only an individual conceived as a rational, self-sufficient, self-empowering, moral being with subjective rights and privileges could enter into a political contract with the state as Hobbes had envisioned, as the Mayflower migrants to America brought to life for the first time through their covenant at New Plymouth in 1620, and as the French nation proclaimed in 1789 (Dumont, 1986, pp. 92-97).

At the onset of modernity, the holistic cosmology was disintegrating, leaving the person individuated from the kin but protected by a personal space established throughout modernity. Biopolitics directed toward potentialities penetrates this personal protective space, leaving a person individuated from the integrity of the self—reduced to biometrics, smaller particles than the self, believed to be still more unique than the self was to the cosmology of modernity. The individual now reduced to biometrics—that most inner and irreducible information about the self that professionals hold to be the true statement of one’s potentialities—enters into a new relationship with the state. We have yet to understand what manner of morality and ethical standards are to support this social order and how ethical and philosophic thought will stand up to the logic of securitization. Some of these questions are addressed by Nieuwenhuys and Pécoud in this issue. What we see so far are battles in the domain of the legal, but this is not to be confused with the moral. As Bauman (1989) concluded, following his analysis of the relationship between bureaucracy and the Holocaust, surveillance is not, or should not be, a matter of what is legally right or wrong. This is so not only because surveillance destroys the protective space of the private but also because of why this is possible. The bureaucratic structure, thought of in the Weberian sense as cumbersome and stable, has shown itself to be moldable and open to reshaping. What does endure, instead, is the bureaucratic logic and its linear, causal, and directional ordering dynamic of human behavior through continuous classification and reclassification of information about individuals. In light of this, philosophy, ethics, and morality will need to measure up not only to the current taxonomy of securitization but also to all its future reinventions and mutations.
References


